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ABSTRACT 
Small European states such as the Netherlands and Denmark, which face 
increasingly complex security challenges, lack the capacity to meet increasing 
intelligence requirements. Since intelligence is vital to counter or prevent threats to 
national interests, small-state leaders must reduce these current intelligence gaps. This 
study focuses on how small European states’ SOF can contribute most efficiently and 
effectively to the national intelligence capacity to anticipate and counter threats from 
foreign regions. Based on literature and interviews with Dutch and Danish civil and 
military officials, this study identifies ways in which SOF can contribute to national 
intelligence capacity. The options include: SOF training the military intelligence service, 
SOF enabling military intelligence operations through integrated support, and SOF 
operating independently as an information provider for national decision making. This 
study, based on analysis of these options, suggests that a combination of integrating SOF 
into intelligence operations and allowing SOF to conduct information 
collection operations independently represents the most effective and efficient way to 
contribute to the national intelligence capacity. In that regard, the integrated option is 
more congruent with operations in non-permissive areas, and SOF as independent 
collectors with permissive areas. 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Europe has been witnessing an escalation of threats on its eastern and southern 
flanks, which increases regional instability and, consequently, European states’ need for 
intelligence.1 As pernicious actors exploit Europe’s deteriorating security environment, 
small European states such as the Netherlands and Denmark have changed their foreign 
security policies, emphasizing national interests through preventive, integrated strategies 
in foreign regions.2 At the same time, their governments have sought to enhance 
intelligence self-sufficiency to decrease reliance on NATO partners such as the United 
States. These policy shifts have significantly increased national-level intelligence 
requirements, exacerbating existing intelligence “gaps” given their limited intelligence 
capabilities. Yet, because Special Operations Forces (SOF) are accustomed to information 
gathering and have distinct capabilities, some Dutch and Danish military leaders and civil 
officials seek to know whether SOF can augment intelligence capabilities.   
B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
The primary purpose of this study is to explore how SOF from small European 
states such as Denmark and the Netherlands, which possess unique capabilities and access 
to foreign regions, can best contribute to the strategic intelligence capacity. This study may 
also provide senior-level leaders with new insights for employing SOF as a strategic 
intelligence instrument. 
                                                 
1 Dutch Ministry of Defense, MIVD Jaarverslag 2017 (The Hague, NL: MIVD, 2018), 16, 
https://www.defensie.nl/downloads/jaarverslagen/2018/04/26/jaarverslag-mivd-2017; Elizabeth Oren, “A 
Dilemma of Principles: The Challenges of Hybrid Warfare from a NATO Perspective,” Special Operations 
Journal 2, no. 1 (2016): 60. doi:10.1080/23296151.2016.1174522; Rasmus A. Boserup, Luke Patey, and 
Hetav Rojan, In a Time of Crisis: Danish Foreign Policy in the Middle East and North Africa 
(Copenhagen, Danish Institute for Strategic Studies, 2018), 18. 
2 Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Update International Security Strategy, Turbulente Tijden in een 
Instabiele Omgeving (The Hague, NL: MoFA, 2014), 
https://www.defensie.nl/downloads/brieven/2014/11/14/beleidsbrief-internationale-veiligheid 
2 
Focusing on the intelligence systems of small European states and, specifically, 
their military intelligence services, this study provides a brief overview of the Dutch and 
Danish intelligence services. In Denmark, two intelligence services provide strategic-level 
intelligence: the Danish Defense Intelligence Service (DDIS) and the Danish Police 
Intelligence Service (DPIS). In the Netherlands, the Military Intelligence and Security 
Service (MISS) and the General Intelligence and Security Service (GISS) provide 
intelligence to national leadership. In both states, the military intelligence services provide 
intelligence from foreign regions and function under the Ministry of Defense (MoD). Since 
this study explores SOF’s contributing role to national-level intelligence in foreign regions, 
its scope is limited to the military intelligence services due to their foreign focus and, like 
SOF, their functioning under the MoD. If SOF can contribute to the national-level 
intelligence system, they will, presumably, collaborate or cooperate with a military 
intelligence service. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
In the Netherlands and Denmark, many senior-level military and civil officials 
assume that SOF can significantly enhance the national intelligence capacity.3 SOF, given 
their experience conducting tactical intelligence during special reconnaissance missions, 
is well positioned to provide strategic-level intelligence, potentially narrowing the 
national intelligence “gaps.” With their ability to operate long term under complex 
circumstances, providing “ground truth,” SOF could contribute to a more complete 
understanding of local security dynamics. Moreover, they have the ability to support a wide  
 
 
                                                 
3 Commander Dutch Special Operations Command, interview by author, Monterey, CA, 8 August 
2018; Head of Commander Advisory Group NLSOCOM, personal interview by author, The Hague, NL, 29 
August 2018; Head of the Department of Secret Operations Dutch Military Intelligence and Security 
Service, personal interview by author, The Hague, NL, 31 August 2018; Head of Plans Dutch Army SOF 
Regiment and former senior Leader of the Department of Secret Operations Dutch Military Intelligence and 
Security Service, personal interviews, Roosendaal, NL, 27 and 30 August 2018; Commander Dutch Army 
SOF regiment, interview by author, Roosendaal, NL, 30 August 2018; Deputy Director Danish Defense 
Intelligence Service, interview, Copenhagen DNK, 03 September 2018. 
3 
spectrum of intelligence operations in foreign areas. For this reason, the central question 
of this study is: 
How can SOF from small European states most efficiently and effectively 
contribute to the intelligence capacity needed to forecast and counter threats from foreign 
regions? 
D. BACKGROUND 
Since European states’ domestic and foreign security concerns are interrelated, 
national leaders need to understand the international security dynamic and its components. 
This section first discusses the key European security issues. Next, shifts in the geopolitical 
balance of power affecting Europe are reviewed, followed by current policies of small 
European states. All these factors demonstrate the need for increased intelligence and the 
strain it puts on the current intelligence system.        
1. European Security Issues 
In Europe, the primary security issues are hybrid warfare, terrorism, and migration. 
As hybrid warfare consists of multiple types of threats from numerous instruments of 
power, ICs currently confront a significantly increased workload. Contributing to this 
increase is the fact that pernicious actors use a palette of both conventional military 
capabilities and non-traditional methods and means to advance their objectives. In his 
paper, “Masters of Chaos,” Matthew Lauder describes hybrid warfare as the deliberate, 
unconventional, and synchronized use of primarily non-military and non-violent military 
instruments to achieve strategic interests.4 Both state and non-state actors recently have 
blended these instruments into integrated, unconventional approaches, emphasizing 
indirect strategies.5  Malicious actors such as Russia have been using hybrid warfare to 
                                                 
4 Matthew A. Lauder, Masters of Chaos: The Application of Political Warfare by the Russian 
Federation in the Contemporary Operating Environment, DRDC-RDDC-2018-L118 (Toronto, 
CAN: Defense Research and Development Canada, 2018), 20.  
5 S.G. Chekinov and S.A. Bogdanov, "The Nature and Content of a New-Generation War," Military 
Thought, vol. 4 (October-December, 2013); Oren, "A Dilemma of Principles: The Challenges of Hybrid 
Warfare from a NATO Perspective," 60; Lauder, Masters of Chaos: The Application of Political Warfare 
by the Russian Federation in the Contemporary Operating Environment, 25. 
4 
manipulate European decision-making processes, influence public opinion, increase 
uncertainty, and disrupt the existing (supra)national cohesion.6  
Concerning means, adversaries have been using a wide range of non-traditional 
actors and tools to benefit their interests. Mike Winnerstig in his paper “Tools of 
Destabilization,” and Merle Maigre, who studied Russian operations in Ukraine, 
demonstrate that politicians, religious leaders, media, cultural institutions, youth 
movements, private military corporations, motor clubs, and scholars have been exploited 
and integrated into unconventional strategies.7 Furthermore, aggressors have integrated 
SOF and hackers into hybrid warfare.8 As SOF have operated alongside non-state proxies, 
state-controlled hackers in troll farms have conducted cyberattacks against the critical 
infrastructure of competing actors, shaping situations to the aggressor’s advantage. 
Moreover, malicious actors can use access to energy resources as a relevant instrument in 
the hybrid toolbox, exerting pressure on political decision makers in energy-dependent 
states to further weaken them.9 All of these non-traditional strategies and instruments have 
increased the density of the fog of war, requiring better intelligence to clear that fog.  
Terrorism emanating from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is 
also a significant security issue in Europe and its neighboring regions. Terrorist groups 
such as the Islamic States of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) clearly intend to exploit instability 
                                                 
6 Lauder. Masters of Chaos: The Application of Political Warfare by the Russian Federation in the 
Contemporary Operating Environment, 25, 28, 31; Dutch Ministry of Defense, MIVD Jaarverslag 2017, 18.  
7 Merle Maigre, Crimea: The Achilles' Heel of Ukraine (Tallinn, EE: International Centre for Defense 
Studies, 2008), 10-16; Andis Kudor, “Russian Soft-Power and Non-Military Influence: The View From 
Latvia,” in Tools of Destabilization: Russian Soft Power and Non-Military Influence in the Baltic States, 
FOI-R-3990-SE, ed. Mike Winnerstig ( Stockholm, SE: Total Defense Research Institute, 2014), 110-111; 
Mike Winnerstig, "Conclusions and Implications for Further Research,” in Tools of Destabilization: 
Russian Soft Power and Non-Military Influence in the Baltic States, FOI-R-3990-SE, ed. Mike Winnerstig ( 
Stockholm, SE: Total Defense Research Institute, 2014), 142-143.  
8 Matthew A. Lauder, "‘Wolves of the Russian Spring’: An Examination of the Night Wolves as a 
Proxy for the Russian Government," Canadian Military Journal 18, no. 3 (Summer 2018): 7-11.  
9 Via Ratsiborynska, "Russia's Hybrid Warfare in the Form of its Energy Manoeuvers Against Europe: 
How the EU and NATO can Respond Together," no 147, ISSN 2076 0957 (Rome, IT: NATO Defense 
College, 2018), 2.  
5 
in this region to train and launch attacks on Europe,10 and European states can expect these 
attacks to increase.11 Moreover, many foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) from Europe, upon 
returning to their country of origin, have been promoting jihadi ideologies, cultivating 
terrorism, and planning and executing attacks.12  
Migration is currently another security issue that destabilizes and threatens states’ 
security, increasing small European state leaders’ needs for better intelligence. According 
to the European Union (EU), more than 1.8 million people illegally crossed the E.U.´s outer 
border in 2015, more than six-fold the 2014 number.13 In 2016, the Danish minister of 
Foreign Affairs called migration the biggest challenge of the 21st century.14 Moreover, the 
Dutch EU commissioner contended that the EU has been experiencing significant pressure 
from migration.15 As the northern Africa security situation deteriorates and becomes more 
complex, European states need to identify the factors generating these migration flows.16 
Furthermore, ISIS and al-Qaida operate in the MENA region and both groups have used 
                                                 
10 Dutch Ministry of Justice and Security, NCTV: Chance of Attack in the Netherlands Still Real (The 
Hague, NL: National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism, 2018), 
https://english.nctv.nl/organisation/counterterrorism/TerroristThreatAssessmentNetherlands/index.aspx  
11 Danish Defence Intelligence Service; Intelligence Risk Assessment 2017-2018, (Copenhagen Danish 
Defence Intelligence Service, 2017), https://fe-
ddis.dk/SiteCollectionDocuments/FE/EfterretningsmaessigeRisikovurderinger/Risikovurdering2017English
Version.pdf.   
12 Foreign Terrorist Fighters: individuals who travel to a state other than their state of residence for the 
perpetration, planning or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts. Source: United Nations Security 
Council resolution 2178 (24 September 2014), 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2178%20%282014%29. 
13 Frontex is cooperation within EU to strengthen the areas of migration, asylum, and security, and was 
initiated in 1999.  
14 Kasper Frandsen and Cicilie Gormsen, “Kristian Jensen: Migration er en større trussel end terror” 
Altinget, January 29, 2016, https://www.altinget.dk/artikel/145764-kristian-jensen-migration-er-en-stoerre-
trussel-end-terror. 
15 Arjan Noorlander, “Timmermans: meer dan helft vluchtelingen heeft economisch motief,” 
Nederlandse Omroep Stichting, January 25, 2016, https://nos.nl/artikel/2082786-timmermans-meer-dan-
helft-vluchtelingen-heeft-economisch-motief.html. 
16 Danish Defence Intelligence Service; Intelligence Risk Assessment 2017-2018, (Copenhagen Danish 
Defence Intelligence Service, 2017), https://fe-
ddis.dk/SiteCollectionDocuments/FE/EfterretningsmaessigeRisikovurderinger/Risikovurdering2017English
Version.pdf.   
6 
the migration flows to send terrorists to Europe to conduct attacks.17 Additionally, 
according to the Dutch ministry of Foreign Affairs, an influx of migrants in (small) 
European states correlates to an increase in transnational crime and polarization within 
societies.18 In European states, the increasing diversity in the population has fueled right-
wing sentiments and other extreme convictions. These developments have further ignited 
fragmentation within European social systems. The major influx of migrants has been 
threatening the stability of European states and has further increased politicians need for 
better intelligence.19  
2. Shift in the Geopolitical Balance of Power 
Besides the three European security issues—hybrid warfare, terrorism, and 
migration—European leaders also need to address shifts in the geopolitical balance of 
power. Affected by changing U.S. interests and geopolitical priorities, European states 
presently rely less on intelligence from North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
partners and more on intelligence they produce themselves.20 The current international 
system can be characterized as a multi order,21 with states increasingly seeking new forms 
of cooperation due to competing ideas and interests. This new multipolar world order is 
fundamentally changing U.S.-European relationships. In particular, the current U.S. 
administration´s dissatisfaction with NATO-contributions has created tensions between the 
                                                 
17 Danish Police Intelligence Service, Assessment of the Terrorist Threat to Denmark (Copenhagen, 
DK: Center for Terrorism Analysis, 2018.) 
https://www.pet.dk/Publikationer/~/media/VTD%202018/VurderingafterrortruslenmodDanmark2018pdf.as
hx. 
18 Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Wereldwijd voor een Veilig Nederland: Geïntegreerd Buitenland- 
en Veiligheidsstrategie 2018-2022 (The Hague, NL: MoFA, 2018), 9, 15, 
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2018/03/19/notitie-geintegreerde-buitenland--en-
veiligheidsstrategie-gbvs 
19 Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Wereldwijd voor een Veilig Nederland: Geïntegreerd Buitenland- 
en Veiligheidsstrategie 2018-2022, 15.  
20 Deputy Director Danish Defense Intelligence Service, interview, Copenhagen DNK, 03 September 
2018. 
 21 Stephan de Spiegeleire et al., Strategische Monitor 2017-2018: Stilte voor de Storm? (The Hague, 
NL: The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies and Clingendael Institute, 2018), 1, 6, 
https://www.clingendael.org/publication/strategische-monitor-2017-2018; Samuel P. Huntington, The 
Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 
7 
United States and Europe, possibly calling into question the future level of cooperation.22 
As a consequence, European states may feel impelled to increase their ability to acquire 
intelligence independently to advance their own interests.  
Given that the United States currently focuses less on Africa, European states may 
need to increase their intelligence capabilities in this vast region. As stated by Emily 
Estelle, a senior analyst at the American Enterprise Institute, “Historically, U.S. policy has 
been treating Africa mostly as a receptacle for development aid and a tertiary theater for 
counterterrorism efforts, behind the Middle East and South Asia.”23 Since the deaths of 
four American Special Forces operators in Niger in October 2017, the U.S. military 
presence in Africa has come under question by the U.S. public and elected officials. As 
Estelle contends, “The administration’s reprioritization from counterterrorism to great 
power competition has left Africa without a coherent [U.S. security] strategy.”24 Due to 
the U.S. shifting priorities, European states can rely less on U.S. intelligence support, 
further challenging their intelligence services to meet the new demands.     
3. Current Dutch and Danish Foreign Security Policies 
To meet current and future security threats, Denmark and the Netherlands have 
shifted their focus to regions of national interests, using preventive and integrated 
approaches.25 These approaches demand a wide range of accurate strategic-level 
intelligence to support programs intended to achieve desired political outcomes. Given 
increased regional instabilities, small European states need to monitor developments in 
these areas and proactively anticipate and defuse crises. Cost-efficient preventive 
                                                 
22 Joyce P. Kaufman, “The US perspective on NATO under Trump: lessons of the past and prospects 
for the future,” International Affairs, vol. 93, issue 2 (2017), 251–266, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix009. 
23 Emily Estelle, “America ignores Africa to its Peril: Washington needs to counter the spread of 
terrorists and rival powers before it’s too late,” The National Interest (Washington, DC: Center for the 
National Interest, 2018), 201, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/america-ignores-africa-its-peril-26596. 
24 Estelle “America Ignores Africa to Its Peril”. 
25 Peter Taksoe-Jensen, Danish Diplomacy and Defence in Times of Change: The Way Ahead for 
Denmark’s Interests and Values towards 2030 (Copenhage, DK: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016), 4-5, 
http://um.dk/da/Udenrigspolitik/aktuelle-emner/dansk-diplomati-og-forsvar-i-en-brydningstid/; Dutch 
Government Policy Accord 2017-2021, Vertrouwen in de Toekomst (The Hague, NL, 2017), 2, 46-47, 
https://www.kabinetsformatie2017.nl/documenten/publicaties/2017/10/10/regeerakkoord-vertrouwen-in-
de-toekomst; Spiegeleire et al., Strategische Monitor 2017-2018: Stilte voor de Storm?, 17.  
8 
approaches need to focus on the breeding grounds of instability and help fragile states avoid 
being overtaken by events, requiring foresight and a “decision advantage” that intelligence 
can provide. To anticipate future events, states need more reliable intelligence for proper 
contextual understanding of a situation within a region of interest. While the current 
capability of small European states to detect “early” signals in such regions is limited, states 
need to invest more in anticipating security threats. To establish this strategic anticipation 
and “early-warning/early-action” capacity, states need understanding derived from 
accurate intelligence.26 Moreover, presently, Dutch and Danish foreign policies use 
integrated approaches, optimally mixing available national instruments of power and 
relevant players—governmental, international, and societal actors—to improve the 
stability of such regions.27 To develop an effective national integrated approach and better 
employ national instruments of power, Dutch and Danish leaders require different types of 
information.  
To summarize, the increased instability in and around Europe, the global shifts in 
the balance of power, and the Dutch and Danish desire for integrated strategies increase 
the need of both small states for independently generated, national intelligence. European 
leaders not only need information about activities and locations of, for example, 
conventional military capabilities or terrorists, they also need intelligence concerning 
factors causing regional complexity and instability. National-level leaders are interested in 
aggressors’ efforts to influence public perceptions. Rather than reacting to crises, national 
leaders desire to act with foresight and prevent crises. These developments demand more 
                                                 
26 Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Security Strategy: Veilige Wereld, Veilig Nederland 
(The Hague, NL, 2013), 14, 
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/binaries/rijksoverheid/documenten/rapporten/2013/06/21/veilige-wereld-
veilig-nederland-internationale-veiligheidsstrategie/veilige-wereld-veilig-nederland-internationale-
veiligheidsstrategie.pdf; Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. International Security Strategy: Veilige 
Wereld, Veilig Nederland, 1, 8-10, 19-20; Danish Government Foreign and Security Policy 2017-18. 
http://um.dk/da/udenrigspolitik/aktuelle-emner/udenrigs-og-sikkerhedspolitisk-strategi-2017-18/; Taksøe-
Jensen, Danish Diplomacy and Defence in Times of Change: The Way Ahead for Denmark’s Interests and 
Values towards 2030; Dutch Government Policy Accord 2017-2021, Vertrouwen in de Toekomst, 2, 46-47. 
27 Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. International Security Strategy: Veilige Wereld, Veilig 
Nederland, 1, 8-10, 19-20; Danish Government Foreign and Security Policy 2017-18. 
http://um.dk/da/udenrigspolitik/aktuelle-emner/udenrigs-og-sikkerhedspolitisk-strategi-2017-18/; Taksøe-
Jensen, Danish Diplomacy and Defence in Times of Change: The Way Ahead for Denmark’s Interests and 
Values towards 2030; Dutch Government Policy Accord 2017-2021, Vertrouwen in de Toekomst, 2, 46-47. 
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intelligence, further straining the intelligence system and widening existing intelligence 
gaps.  
E. METHODOLOGY 
This study explores literature on the factors that have increased state leaderships’ 
intelligence requirements,28 examining the European security situation, shifts in the global 
security environment, small European states’ shifts in the foreign security policies, those 
states’ intelligence organizations and their challenges, and SOF’s potential role in pre-
conflict operations. 
Furthermore, to obtain insights concerning the current European security 
environment, the challenges within the intelligence system, and SOF’s potential 
contribution to national intelligence capacity, this study includes interviews with Dutch 
and Danish military and civil authorities: SOF commanders and their staff-section 
directors, Dutch MISS and Danish DIS officials, and a Danish politician. The interview 
questions can be found in Appendix B, divided into four main categories: 
• Threats to small European states; 
• Small European state foreign security policies; 
• Current strategic intelligence capabilities and the associated challenges; 
• SOF’s potential to contribute to the national intelligence capacity and its 
challenges. 
Based on literature, interviews, and empirical data, the authors have defined three 
options for how SOF can contribute to the national-level intelligence capacity and narrow 
the gap between supply and demand. The advantages and disadvantages of each option are 
analyzed using the following criteria determined and defined by the authors and validated 
by the aforementioned individuals: 
                                                 
28 Literature review can be found in Appendix A. 
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• Efficiency and effectiveness:  Efficiency is defined as achieving maximum 
productivity with minimum wasted effort or expense. In comparison, 
effectiveness is defined as success in producing a desired or intended 
result. 
• Command and control: U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) defines 
command and control as “The exercise of authority and direction by a 
properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the 
accomplishment of the mission.”29 Nevertheless, command and control 
can be separated, whereas command represents authority and 
responsibility, and control a steering and supervisory function. 
• Suitability: The quality of being right or appropriate for a particular 
purpose, situation, task, or mission. The definition also includes speed of 
implementation. 
• Availability: The availability of personnel, means, and infrastructure with 
regards to specific ways in which SOF can be employed.  
• Sustainability:  The ability to maintain a certain rate or level of capacity 
and capabilities, and avoiding depletion of resources. The definition also 
includes, avoiding mission creep in regards to standing NATO SOF tasks. 
The analysis compares the SOF options and, based on the analysis results, identifies 
the most efficient and effective way in which SOF can contribute to the national 
intelligence capacity. 
 
                                                 
29 Joint Chiefs of Staff, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, (Washington, DC: Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 2018), http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf?ver=2018-
09-28-100314-687 
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F. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Chapter II addresses the intelligence requirements and concludes with an overview 
of the challenges facing small European states in meeting them. Chapter III provides 
insight into small European SOF’s capabilities and analyzes three potential options for how 
SOF can augment national intelligence capabilities. The SOF options are analyzed 
separately using the defined criteria, interview findings, and the authors’ assessment of 
advantages and disadvantages. Chapter IV presents the research findings, answers the 
research question, introduces a discussion of implications, and concludes. 
G. SOF AND INTELLIGENCE REFERENCES  
All references to SOF in the following chapters refer to Dutch and Danish SOF 
specifically and small European SOF in general. Additionally, references to the military 
intelligence services are specific to the MISS and the DDIS.  
H. TRANSLATIONS 
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II. INTELLIGENCE CHALLENGES FOR 
SMALL STATES 
What is called foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits, nor from gods, 
nor by analogy with past events, nor from calculations. It must be obtained 




In a rapidly changing security environment, small European states’ leaders 
increasingly need timely and accurate intelligence to develop preventive, integrated 
strategies focused on national interests, thus requiring enhanced intelligence capacity.31 
Intelligence services, already strained due to resource scarcity and increased demands, 
experience organizational and operational challenges, further widening the gap between 
supply and demand of national-level intelligence. National leaders from small European 
states, similar to the Netherlands and Denmark, need to solve these challenges. This 
chapter, after defining intelligence, focuses on strategic intelligence requirements, the 
intelligence organization, and the organizational and operational challenges within the 
small European states’ system of national information providers and, specifically, the 
military intelligence services. 
B. WHAT IS INTELLIGENCE?32  
Information represents raw data that has not been processed or validated, whereas 
intelligence is selected, combined, analyzed, and validated information that often 
originates from multiple sources, but is presented as one coherent product.33 The 
                                                 
30 Sun Tzu, The Art of War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), 144-145. 
31 Onderzoekgroep Inlichtingen en Veiligheid Defensie, Inlichtingen en Veiligheid Defensie: Kwaliteit, 
Capaciteit en Samenwerking (Utrecht, Foundation Argus, 2005), 39-40, 42, 
http://www.stichtingargus.nl/bvd/publicaties/inlichtingenveiligheid.pdf. 
32 From this point forward, unless otherwise indicated, the term “intelligence” is intended to refer to 
national-level intelligence used for national decision making. 
33 Onderzoekgroep Inlichtingen en Veiligheid Defensie, Inlichtingen en Veiligheid Defensie, 22. 
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processing of basic information includes validating, merging, and analyzing all accessible 
information, often splintered and conflicting, into intelligence products.34 While pieces of 
information are integrated into an intelligible whole that subsequently is put into context, 
Peter Gill and Mark Phythian, in their book Intelligence in an Insecure World, contend that 
intelligence also includes assessments and judgments about its consequences, the “so 
what,” of the collected information.35 Intelligence is the product of gathering and 
processing information in a specific way.36 As such, it can be viewed both as information 
and a process. 
Intelligence provides a number of critical advantages for national leaders dealing 
with security challenges, including tactical and strategic warning. Intelligence also 
provides a decision advantage for national leaders during all phases of policy development 
and implementation, thus reducing uncertainty.37 Information can also generate a broader 
palette of strategic options for decision makers, identifying opportunities that enable them 
to advance national objectives.38 Therefore, intelligence can be employed both as a guiding 
instrument for decision making and as a tool for the implementation of strategy or policy. 
As a guiding instrument, intelligence adds to the policymakers’ knowledge regarding the 
intentions and capabilities of competitors; information determines threats and favorable 
circumstances for political activities. As a tool for the implementation of strategy or policy, 
leaders use intelligence to direct national power.39 With these different roles and functions, 
intelligence remains vitally relevant for senior leaders. 
                                                 
34 Peter Gill and Mark Phythian, Intelligence in an Insecure World (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 
2018), 3-4. 
35 Gill and Phythian. Intelligence in an Insecure World, 3-4.  
36 Onderzoekgroep Inlichtingen en Veiligheid Defensie, Inlichtingen en Veiligheid Defensie, 22; Gill 
and Phythian. Intelligence in an Insecure World, 30-31. 
37 Gill and Phythian. Intelligence in an Insecure World, 30; Bob de Graaff, “De Nederlandse 
Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdiensten: Nooit te Oud om te Leren,” in Groniek; Spionage: de Rol van 
Spionage- en Inlichtingendiensten, ed. Nienke de Jong et al., (Groningen, University of Groningen Press, 
2013), 250-251, https://rjh.ub.rug.nl/groniek/article/download/17709/15176. 
38 John Tullius, “Organizing for Sophisticated Analysis: Key Foundational, Procedural, and 
Bureaucratic Factors,” (unpublished article, September, 2018). 
39 Peter Jackson and Jennifer Siegel. Intelligence and Statecraft: The Use and Limits of Intelligence in 
International Society (London: Praeger, 2005), 12-13. 
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Intelligence consists of various types. Intelligence services can generate 
intelligence in an open manner by merging publicly available data or passively monitoring 
an environment. They can also gather intelligence in a more intrusive way, violating the 
privacy of others: the difference between overt and covert intelligence.40 Additionally, 
intelligence can also be classified by source. The collection and analysis of public 
information is called open source intelligence (OSINT), whereas intelligence derived from 
satellite imagery or aerial weapon systems is known as imagery intelligence (IMINT). 
Signal intelligence (SIGINT), geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), and medical intelligence 
(MEDINT) are, respectively, intelligence derived from telecommunication and 
electromagnetic transmissions; intelligence obtained by displaying multiple data on a 
geospatial map; and intelligence about medical issues, such as epidemics.41  
Lastly, human intelligence (HUMINT) is based on information derived from 
human sources, whereby operators build trusted relationships and recruit assets to provide 
unique intelligence that is often not available through other means. All these activities 
require a lot of time and often are inherently risky. Additionally, HUMINT collectors often 
operate in complex environments with a higher risk to mission and personnel. For this 
reason, intelligence services exercise caution when employing HUMINT operators. In 
general, intelligence services preferably use other sources to collect information before 
resorting to HUMINT.42 
C. INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS  
Given both the complexity and the rapidly changing international security 
environment, national decision-makers increasingly need relevant, timely, and accurate 
intelligence to develop policy and strategy, straining the small-state intelligence services. 
The growing number of threats to Europe, emanating from denied areas, is providing 
                                                 
40 Gill and Phythian. Intelligence in an Insecure World, 31. 
41 Dutch Ministry of Defense, MIVD Jaarverslag 2016, (The Hague, MIVD, 2017), 9, 
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/jaarverslagen/2017/04/24/jaarverslag-mivd-2016. 
42 Onderzoekgroep Inlichtingen en Veiligheid Defensie. Inlichtingen en Veiligheid Defensie, 128-129.  
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additional challenges for small European states’ intelligence services.43 For example, 
migration and FTF influxes from Syria, Iraq, and Libya are particularly challenging, and 
national leaders increasingly need information on these issues to deal with them. As 
hostilities start, many actors, such as non-governmental organizations (NGO) or other civil 
organizations, have to leave a region because they are neither trained nor equipped to 
operate under hazardous circumstances, leaving national leadership with only scarce state 
capabilities to provide essential intelligence. The paucity of intelligence about these denied 
areas undermines European state leaders’ ability to anticipate and counter crises.  
Furthermore, their intelligence services need to maintain a regional focus to provide 
adequate strategic foresight. Military intelligence services are often directed to focus on 
short-term threats, but also see the need to anticipate and understand future security 
developments, according to the Dutch commander of the Special Operations Command 
and the head of his Advisory Group.44 To identify these potential, future threats, services 
need to stay fully connected with a foreign region of national interest. Given that threats 
are not constant and contemporary security situations shift quickly, intelligence services 
must focus on regions and monitor their security developments to generate the needed 
foresight, requiring intelligence services with sufficient resources and personnel.   
Moreover, as small European state leaders seek to prevent conflict escalation, they 
need to employ their intelligence capabilities early and in a flexible manner.45 While 
malicious actors shift methods and means opportunistically, as discussed in Chapter I, 
intelligence services need to focus on these shifts, identify potential escalations, and 
provide options to counter these challenges. Through early, persistent presence in 
nationally selected foreign areas, small European states will not only improve their 
                                                 
43 Denied area: An area under enemy or unfriendly control in which friendly forces cannot expect to 
operate successfully within existing operational constraints and force capabilities. Source: United States 
Department of Defense. DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (2018), s.v. “denied areas,” 
accessed November 5, 2018. http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf.  
44 Commander Dutch Special Operations Command, interview by author, Monterey, CA, 8 August 
2018; Head of Commander Advisory Group NLSOCOM, personal interview by author, The Hague, NL, 29 
August 2018. 
45 B.A. de Graaf, E.R. Muller, and J.A. van Reijn, Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten (Alphen aan 
den Rijn, NL: Kluwer, 2010), 610, 628. 
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foresight to prevent regional crises, but they will also enhance their ability to anticipate 
short-term future regional developments quickly. In the case of an unforeseen event such 
as the downing of the Malaysian MH-17 in 2014, as a team leader within the Dutch MISS 
emphasized,46 information providers operating in an area of national interest are best 
positioned to provide both tactical intelligence and longer-term strategic foresight.  
Although military intelligence services are primarily strategically oriented and 
focused on providing information about the security situation and stability within a 
region,47 they also have military-operational and tactical intelligence responsibilities to 
augment the tactical force protection efforts of conventional and SOF units. While the 
division between tactical, operational, and strategic intelligence has blurred, small states’ 
policymakers require intelligence derived from all levels. When an unforeseen event 
occurs, as the downing of the MH-17 has demonstrated, military intelligence services must 
provide a range of tactical and strategic intelligence to national leaders.48  
Today, European states are much less reliant on intelligence input from NATO 
partners because many countries, such as the United States, have shifted their focus to 
regions that occasionally differ from the small European states’ areas of interest. 
Additionally, intelligence provided by foreign partners has not always been accurate or met 
European states’ requirements,49 resulting in the need for independent national intelligence 
capabilities.50 However, small-states’ intelligence are struggling to meet these 
requirements. Consequently, they must work with other information providers, such as 
NGOs, businesses, knowledge institutions and military units operating in various regions 
of interest, to fulfill national intelligence requirements. Given the vast range of security 
                                                 
46 Team leader Strategic Warning and Intelligence Response Dutch Military Intelligence and Security 
Service, FaceTime interview by author, Monterey, CA, 6 September 2018. 
47 Commander Dutch Special Operations Command, interview; Dutch Ministry of Defense. MIVD 
Jaarverslag 2016, 6. 
48 Commander Dutch Special Operations Command, interview.  
49 Head of the Department of Secret Operations Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service, 
personal interview by author, The Hague, NL, 31 August 2018. 
50 Head of the Department of Secret Operations Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service, 
interview; Deputy Director Danish Defense Intelligence Service, interview, Copenhagen DNK, 03 
September 2018. 
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issues, combined with the intelligence services limited capabilities, national leaders must 
provide clear requirements.51 
To effectively deal with contemporary conflicts, national leaders need intelligence 
about the plans and intentions of malicious actors, as well as the local perceptions about 
security situations. During the Cold War, mostly a bipolar security arrangement, the 
intelligence requirements where much more defined and easier to target and collect, given 
the nature of the key issues; i.e., the location of critical military and diplomatic 
installations. However, the current threats or priorities, especially counter-terrorism and 
counter-proliferation, are much more challenging intelligence issues because of their 
transnational, diffused nature, thus making them increasingly difficult to identify and 
penetrate. 
Nowadays, states’ intelligence services also need to focus on information about the 
motives and future goals of competitors and their influence on local perceptions through, 
for example, information warfare.52 As stated by the head of secret operations within the 
Dutch MISS and the deputy director DDIS, the necessity of intelligence concerning 
adversaries’ intentions and local perceptions have increased in the post-Cold War period.53 
Intelligence about physical threat manifestations, malicious actors’ intentions, and local 
perceptions are necessary ingredients for an adequate intelligence picture that state-level 
leaders need to counter security challenges. These are particularly difficult requirements 
for the intelligence services to address, especially given their current limitations. 
National leaders require intelligence in all phases of national decision making, a 
process that is often neither linear nor sequential, and the next section assesses the national 
intelligence services’ abilities to adequately provide the decision advantage required to 
effectively address these complicated security issues.    
                                                 
51 Head of the Department of Secret Operations Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service, 
interview.  
52 Head of the Department of Secret Operations Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service, 
interview; Deputy Director Danish Defense Intelligence Service, interview. 
53 Head of the Department of Secret Operations Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service, 
interview; Deputy Director Danish Defense Intelligence Service, interview. 
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D. INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS ARE NOT OPTIMIZED TO MEET 
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS 
Given the shifting national priorities and push for more independent intelligence 
capabilities, most small-state intelligence systems undoubtedly face significant challenges 
meeting these requirements, likely leading to significant intelligence gaps. Most notably, a 
variety of organizational and bureaucratic factors, the services lack of experience operating 
in denied areas, and insufficient resources and personnel represent the most significant 
challenges.  
As noted in the introductory chapter, this study is focused on the Dutch and Danish 
military intelligence services, not the civilian intelligence organizations. Military 
intelligence services focus on areas outside their national borders and are seeking to 
enhance their intelligence capabilities to meet national requirements. European states 
maintain separate military and civil intelligence services. Generally, there is also a division 
between intelligence and police, but these divisions have blurred.54 The intelligence 
services use their capabilities to collect information based on the intelligence requirements 
that are assigned to them by interdepartmental steering groups or committees.55 This 
framework prioritizes policy maker requirements and assigns them to the appropriate 
intelligence services.  
A small European state’s military intelligence service is typically part of the 
ministry or department of Defense (see Figure 1) and has its own tasks, means, and methods 
to fulfill national intelligence requirements. Military intelligence services, contrary to 
actors outside the state intelligence system, are authorized to apply specific powers. 
Regulated by a constitutional framework that provides the legal ground, these intelligence 
                                                 
54 Bob de Graaff and James M. Nyce, The Handbook of European Intelligence Cultures (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), xxxix. 
55 Team leader Strategic Warning and Intelligence Response Dutch Military Intelligence and Security 
Service, FaceTime interview.  
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entities are allowed to undertake covert and intrusive intelligence operations.56 
Furthermore, military intelligence services with their functionalities—HUMINT, SIGINT, 
IMINT etc.—are focused on foreign regions of national interest, reflecting senior leaders’ 
strategic requirements. To reduce risk to mission and force, a military intelligence service 
operates from the outside in, which means that it seeks answers to strategic intelligence 
requirements preferably through an indirect approach and from the greatest (physical) 
distance possible.57 The intelligence services employ HUMINT only as a last resort 
because such employments are resource intensive and risky. Because small European 
intelligence services work on a myriad of taskings while contending with limited resources, 
they presently struggle to meet national intelligence requirements.58  
                                                 
56 Head of the Department of Secret Operations Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service, 
interview; Team leader Strategic Warning and Intelligence Response Dutch Military Intelligence and 
Security Service, FaceTime interview; Overheid.nl | Wetten.nl, s.v. “Wet Op De Inlichtingen- En 
Veiligheidsdiensten 2017,” accessed September 12, 2018, http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0039896/2018-
05-01 
57 Head of Plans Dutch Army SOF Regiment and former senior Leader of the Department of Secret 
Operations Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service, interview. 
58 Head of Plans Dutch Army SOF Regiment and former senior Leader of the Department of Secret 
Operations Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service, interview.  
21 
 
Figure 1. Position of Dutch and Danish Military Intelligence Services 
within their organizations 
In addition to the military intelligence services, policy makers often leverage 
information from a variety of diplomatic and non-government organizations,59 creating an 
ecosystem with myriad actors providing information.60 Since there is no clear hierarchical 
structure within the ecosystem, where actors are interconnected and opportunistically 
interact with one another (see Figure 2), information by non-state actors is provided on a 
voluntary, ad-hoc basis. This results in the underutilization of unique information from 
                                                 
59 Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, and Safety 
and Justice. Leidraad Geïntegreerde Benadering: De Nederlandse Visie op een Samenhangende Inzet op 





60 The concept of the system of actors providing information for national decision making as 
ecosystem came from Lcol Nooij, Head of Plans Dutch Army SOF regiment.  
Head of Plans Dutch Army SOF Regiment and former senior Leader of the Department of Secret 
Operations Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service, personal interviews, Roosendaal, NL, 27 and 
30 August 2018. 
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sources with good placement and access.61 The global network of state actors for early 
warning, such as embassies and consulates of small European states, similar to those of the 
Netherlands and Denmark, is inadequate and needs reinforcements.62   
Figure 2. Ecosystem of Actors Providing Information for National Decision 
Making Concerning a Region of National Interest, Including the State 
Intelligence System. 
This official and non-official intelligence structure is characterized by a lack of 
cooperation between the different information providers within the ecosystem, 
compartmentalization, and unintended bureaucratic rigidity, likely contributing to “blind 
spots” that could lead to intelligence failures. According to a 2005 study conducted by an 
intelligence and security research group appointed by the Dutch department of Defense, 
Dutch military intelligence organizations did not have the capacity to independently collect 
61 Head of Plans Dutch Army SOF Regiment and former senior Leader of the Department of Secret 
Operations Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service, interview. 
62 De Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid, Veiligheid in een Wereld van 




all information necessary for national security. They increasingly needed other partners, 
national and international, with whom to cooperate, collaborate, and exchange 
information.63 Due to their scarce resources, intelligence services require effective 
cooperation with other national information collectors. More cooperation and collaboration 
will also result in a wider range of different perspectives that can be incorporated into the 
intelligence product. According to Barbara Gray, collaboration is “a process through which 
parties who see different aspects of a problem can constructively explore their differences 
and search for solutions that go beyond their own limited vision of what is possible.”64 
Intelligence that is created from a wide spectrum of available insights will more likely 
approach the genuine local security situation.65 Through cooperation, collaboration, and 
exchange of information, all participants of the transaction will improve their information 
positions, resulting in better intelligence for policymakers.66  
Furthermore, intelligence services and other information providers often have 
divergent interests and primarily operate in a compartmentalized manner,67 potentially 
undermining cooperation and information sharing.68 These compartmentalized approaches 
together with resource scarcity and inadequate integration within the ecosystem result in a 
suboptimal national intelligence picture.69 As stated by the Dutch head of the department 
of Secret Operations, it is essential that all identified signals and indicators are integrated.70 
                                                 
63 Onderzoekgroep Inlichtingen en Veiligheid Defensie. Inlichtingen en Veiligheid Defensie, 148. 
64 Barbara Gray, Collaborating: Finding Common Ground for Multiparty Problems (San Francisco: 
Jossey Bass, 1999), 5. 
65 De Graaff and Nyce, The Handbook of European Intelligence Cultures, xlii. 
66 Dutch Ministry of Defense. MIVD Jaarverslag 2017 (The Hague, NL: MIVD, 2018), 43, 
https://www.defensie.nl/downloads/jaarverslagen/2018/04/26/jaarverslag-mivd-2017 
67 Head of Plans Dutch Army SOF Regiment and former senior Leader of the Department of Secret 
Operations Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service, interview.  
68 Derek Lothringer et al., “Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Preliminary Field Study in 
Improving Collaboration” (Master’s capstone, Naval Postgraduate School, 2016), 21-22, 
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/48551. 
69 Team leader Strategic Warning and Intelligence Response Dutch Military Intelligence and Security 
Service, interview; Head of the Department of Secret Operations Dutch Military Intelligence and Security 
Service, interview.  
70 Head of the Department of Secret Operations Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service, 
interview. 
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Intelligence services, together with the other actors in the ecosystem, must strive for a more 
integrated perspective.71 To generate new facts and optimize intelligence products, 
information providers need to associate information with other known data in the area of 
operations and integrate it into a whole.72 Unified efforts will generate integrated, higher-
quality intelligence that will better feed into national objectives.  
The military intelligence services, moreover, struggle with unintended bureaucratic 
inflexibility due to their size, structure, and multiple standing operating procedures, which 
likely will hamper their ability to meet the evolving intelligence requirements.73 
Frequently, intelligence services have invested in reinforcing existing functional 
compartments instead of creating new or different capabilities or functionalities,74  
resulting in rigid organizational approaches that prevent intelligence services from swiftly 
adapting to adversaries’ opportunistic security shifts. As adversaries capitalize on this 
inflexibility, they also exploit changing circumstances to advance their objectives.75 This 
unintended bureaucratic inflexibility limits the services’ ability to quickly adjust to shifting 
circumstances and generate optimal intelligence products.  
In addition to the organizational challenges, the military intelligence services tend 
to lack the requisite experience to operate in denied areas and have insufficient resources 
and personnel to meet national intelligence requirements. Given the nature of these 
requirements, military intelligence services must enhance operations in denied areas; 
however, they lack adequate capabilities to operate in these areas, according to the 2005 
research and the head of plans within the Dutch Army SOF regiment.76 While intelligence 
                                                 
71 Head of the Department of Secret Operations Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service, 
interview.  
72 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Intelligence, JP 2-0 (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013), I-16, 
https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp2_0.pdf 
73 De Graaff, “De Nederlandse Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdiensten: Nooit te Oud om te Leren,” 261. 
74 Team leader Strategic Warning and Intelligence Response Dutch Military Intelligence and Security 
Service, interview.  
75 De Graaff, “De Nederlandse Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdiensten: Nooit te Oud om te Leren,” 261. 
76 Onderzoekgroep Inlichtingen en Veiligheid Defensie. Inlichtingen en Veiligheid Defensie, 30-31, 86, 
124, 198, 202-203; Head of Plans Dutch Army SOF Regiment and former senior Leader of the Department 
of Secret Operations Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service, interview.  
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services are capable of successfully handling their human sources, they need skill sets to 
access and operate in denied areas and deal with any contingencies found in these areas.77 
Skill sets such as weapons handling, fire and maneuver, and medical first aid are necessary 
to conduct intelligence operations in these denied areas; however, small European state 
intelligence services currently do not adequately possess them.78 To address these 
shortcoming, the military intelligence services require significant training by personnel 
with experience operating in hostile environments. Moreover, the military intelligence 
services, already struggling to meet the enhanced operational tempo since the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks, will need more personnel to fulfill the burgeoning intelligence requirements.79  
The cumulative effect of the organizational and operational challenges facing the 
military services result in intelligence “blind spots,” which for this study are defined as 
geographical or functional areas policy makers are concerned about, but that the current 
small-states’ intelligence capacities and capabilities cannot adequately cover; specifically, 
with HUMINT, but also other types of intelligence, e.g. OSINT, SIGINT etc. Intelligence 
blind spots exist in areas with and without national representation such as embassies and 
consulates and denied areas, requiring strategies to augment intelligence capabilities. The 
existence of these blind spots hampers national leaders’ knowledge of critical areas, 
significantly increasing the potential for intelligence failures.  
To summarize, the key challenges to small-state intelligence services are: 
• Organizational issues, including lack of cooperation and the need for, 
specifically, national information providers, compartmentalization, and 
bureaucratic rigidity.  
• Inadequate capabilities to operate in denied areas. 
                                                 
77 Commander Dutch Special Operations Command, interview; Head of Plans Dutch Army SOF 
Regiment and former senior Leader of the Department of Secret Operations Dutch Military Intelligence and 
Security Service, interview.  
78 Commander Dutch Special Operations Command, interview.  
79 Onderzoekgroep Inlichtingen en Veiligheid Defensie. Inlichtingen en Veiligheid Defensie, 30-31, 72, 
198-199. 
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• Insufficient numbers of personnel to fully meet intelligence requirements. 
• Intelligence “blind spots” as a result of the above-mentioned challenges.  
Given the imperative of meeting intelligence requirements, and considering the 
current military intelligence services’ limitations, the next chapter will assess SOF’s 
potential ability to address these challenges, augment current intelligence capabilities, and 
minimize “blind spots” that could lead to intelligence failure.  
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III. ANALYZING THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES’ 
OPTIONS TO ENHANCE STRATEGIC 
INFORMATION COLLECTION 
SOF’s greatest value to the Nation…lies in [their] global perspective, 
coupled with the ability to act early with partners to … create decision space 
and strategic options for National Leadership. 
 
—Joseph L. Votel, Commander USSOCOM.80 
 
Chapter II examined the intelligence system of small European states and 
determined that the military intelligence services have both capacity and capability 
shortfalls. Furthermore, a rigid and compartmentalized intelligence system limits 
cooperation and creates blind spots that prevent a deeper understanding of the dynamics in 
critical areas. Though SOF potentially can fulfill a constructive role, organizational 
challenges such as compartmentalization and bureaucratic rigidity within intelligence 
services, go beyond SOF’s ability to resolve. SOF with their unique capabilities and their 
familiarity with information gathering operations might be able to contribute to the 
following challenges: (1) Need for additional information providers; (2) Lack of 
operational flexibility within the information ecosystem; (3) Inadequate capabilities to 
operate in denied areas; (4) Insufficient numbers of personnel to fully meet intelligence 
requirements; (5) Intelligence “blind spots” as a result of the aforementioned challenges. 
This chapter begins with a review of SOF characteristics that suggest small European 
states’ SOF are suitable strategic information collectors. Then it analyzes three distinct 
options by which SOF can potentially strengthen the collection of information, and assesses 
each option. 
                                                 
80 USSOCOM, Directorate of Force Management and Development Concept Development and 
Integration Office. Special Operations Forces Operating Concept: A Whitepaper to Guide Special 
Operations Force Development, 2016 (Tampa, Florida). 
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A. SOF CHARACTERISTICS AND THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO 
STRATEGIC INFORMATION COLLECTION 
SOF have the potential to support the intelligence system, but are neither the Silver 
Bullet nor the Golden Hammer81 solution. Nonetheless, SOF remain a highly trained and 
flexible instrument that can operate under the most difficult circumstances. 
1. Characteristics that Make SOF Suitable as Information Collectors 
SOF are engaged in information collection at the tactical level when executing 
Special Reconnaissance (SR) missions. Furthermore, NATO SOF doctrine defines a 
number of SOF characteristics highlighting a potential role for collecting strategic 
information in denied areas. The following list presents several of these characteristics:  
• Special operations are normally conducted in uncertain, hostile, or 
politically sensitive environments to create effects that support 
achievement of strategic or operational objectives. These operations may 
be conducted using discreet or covert capabilities/techniques and require 
mature and highly trained operators.82 
• Special operations are joint by nature and can be conducted independently 
or in conjunction with other forces. They may include combined and 
interagency operations with or through indigenous or surrogate forces. 
Special operations can produce political, psychological, informational or 
economic impacts.83 
• The successful conduct of special operations relies on individual and small 
unit proficiency in a multitude of specialized, often unconventional 
                                                 
81 Silver Bullet: a simple and seemingly magical solution to a long-standing and complicated problem; 
Golden Hammer: excessive dependence on a specific tool to perform many different functions. 
82 NATO, Doctrine for Special Operations Forces, Allied Joint Publication AJP-3.5 (Belgium: 2014). 
83 Ibid. 
29 
operational skills applied with adaptability, improvisation, and innovation, 
by self-reliant operators.84 
• SOF can operate independently in small groups for extended periods, and 
the command and Control (C2) structure of SOF enables them to operate 
disconnected from higher headquarters, in flexible and task-oriented 
structures.85 
• Older and more experienced special operators possess a calmness and 
composure that enables them to collect strategic-level information in both 
denied and permissive areas.   
SOF can be employed across the peace-war continuum in support of tactical, 
operational, and strategic level collection in both permissive and denied areas. As stated 
by the head of plans within the Dutch Army SOF, “contrary to other strategic information 
collectors who have to depart an area of national interest if it turns hostile, SOF have the 
skill sets to function in denied and politically sensitive areas, gathering valuable 
information that would otherwise be difficult to obtain.”86 Additionally, SOF typically 
work with other military entities and civilian organizations, and can even work under the 
command and control of non-military organizations. Furthermore, SOF’s small footprint 
significantly limits unintended effects and risks.  
Conducting information-gathering or intelligence missions demand additional skill 
sets and a different mindset from most doctrinal NATO SOF tasks. The selection of 
experienced and mature operators who have the ability to blend into the operational 
environment is essential. SOF operators—with additional training— will possess the skills 
and intellect to be information collectors and produce the needed information for analysts 
at higher headquarters.87 In other words, SOF’s personnel, organizational flexibility, 
                                                 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid.  
86 Head of Plans Dutch Army SOF. Personal Interview. AUG/SEP 2018. 
87 Commander Danish Special Operations Command, Interview 04 September 2018. 
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regional expertise, interpersonal communication skills, and knowledge of interagency 
processes, make them a force capable of information collection to contribute to the national 
decision-making in small European countries. 
2.  Potential SOF Intelligence Tasks. 
As stated in Chapter I, the Danish and Dutch areas of interests in the Middle East 
and North African regions are characterized by instability and the presence of armed groups 
that are not necessarily under government control. The military intelligence services are 
hampered by a lack of paramilitary capabilities to operate in these areas, which limits their 
information collection. The following is an incomplete list of possible activities that SOF 
can conduct in support of the military intelligence services to enhance knowledge about 
denied areas: 
• Help the military intelligence services build capabilities to operate in 
denied areas. 
• Provide situational awareness for other actors within the information 
ecosystem based on knowledge gained from being on the ground during 
missions in foreign regions.  
• Select safe houses and develop the security infrastructure to support 
intelligence officers. 
• Help the intelligence services in the identification and recruitment of 
HUMINT sources. 
• Contribute to SIGINT, IMINT, GEOINT, and other technical intelligence 
operations by assisting in emplacing technical devises in denied areas 
using overt, covert, or discreet means. 
• Support a wide range of intelligence operations to confirm or deny 
assumptions or information collected by other means within the 
information ecosystem.  
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In addition to supporting the military intelligence services, SOF can potentially 
operate as an independent entity outside the current intelligence system so long as they are 
linked into the intelligence network, and thereby contribute to the information ecosystem 
in ways that may address the challenges identified in chapter II (see page 24–26). Through 
a (semi-)permanent presence88 in regions of national interest, SOF can obtain situational 
awareness and gather information revealing the “ground truth” or gain the perspective of 
the locals and derive their perceptions of reality. In turn, SOF can potentially glimpse 
adversaries’ future intentions and thereby contribute to generating more foresight for 
national decision-making. The (semi-) permanent presence within a local area, contributes 
to greater cognizance of indigenous conditions, and thereby adds to the foresight necessary 
to effectively deal with emerging security issues. By maintaining a local presence, SOF 
can identify critical local power brokers, their potential vulnerabilities, and the 
psychological factors shaping their perceptions and behavior.89 Through strong regional 
relationships, SOF can contribute to a national-level situational awareness of indigenous 
perspectives and future developments. Additionally, to generate an intelligence picture as 
genuine as possible, states should view the regions of national interest from as many 
different perspectives as possible. Utilizing SOF´s unique network and capabilities will 
provide additional insights based on a deeper understanding of the regional security 
situation. Moreover, congruent with statements  in the Strategische Monitor 2017–2018 
from The Hague Center for Strategic Studies and The Clingendael Institute, through 
(semi)permanent presence without making a clear distinction between strategic and 
tactical information, SOF will be able to continuously scan, monitor, and report security 
developments in that region to create national-level decision space.90 In short, because 
of their unique capabilities to support the military intelligence services and an ability 
to operate independently within the information ecosystem, SOF have the potential to 
                                                 
88 Forward-deployment of SOF without necessarily being permanently present in an area. 
89 USSOCOM; Operating in the Human Domain, 2015 (Tampa, Florida: 2015), 12–14. 
90 Stephan De Spiegeleire, Kars De Bruijne, Frank Bekkers, Minke Meijnders, and Tim 
Sweijs. Strategische Monitor 2017–2018: Stilte voor de Storm? The Hague: The Hague Centre for Strategic 
Studies/ Clingendael Institute, 2018, 2–4, 9, 69–70. https://www.clingendael.org/publication/strategische-
monitor-2017-2018. 
32 
significantly counter the identified intelligence challenges defined in Chapter II (see pages 
24–26).  
B. DESCRIBING AND ANALYZING THE SOF OPTIONS 
A significant part of the research for this capstone focused on obtaining a valid 
basis for how SOF can support national intelligence collection. In 2017, the Dutch minister 
of Defense promoted SOF’s relevance in generating adequate information, together with 
other strategic actors, in the pre-conflict phase to prevent the escalation of conflicts.91 
During their research, the authors forged three options and vetted them during interviews 
with senior leaders in the Dutch and Danish SOF communities. The authors furthermore 
introduced the options to leaders in the Dutch and Danish military intelligence services, all 
of whom confirmed their validity. The following sections describe and analyze the 
advantages and disadvantages of the Train and Advise, Integrated Support, and 
Independent Entity options in terms of their ability to address the previously identified 
challenges in the current information ecosystem. The analysis uses five selection criteria: 
Efficient & Effective, Command & Control, Suitability, Availability, and Sustainability to 
assess each option. The analysis and assessments is done by the authors based on their 
collective judgement derived from decades of experience as special operators. 
Furthermore, the options are not mutually exclusive. When applicable, national leaders can 
use SOF under all three options simultaneously. 
1. The Proposed Options 
SOF can address the defined challenges by any one of the following options: 1) 
Train and Advise, 2) Integrated Support, and 3) Independent Entity. The options are 
significantly different, but in practice, there will be overlaps. Likewise, the options are all 
scalable relative to the availability of SOF.  
                                                 
91 Dutch Ministry of Defence. Houvast in een Onzekere Wereld: Lijnen van Ontwikkeling in het 




a. Option One—Train and Advise the Military Intelligence Services 
The Train and Advise option seeks to support the creation of paramilitary 
capabilities within the military intelligence services, and thus enable them to operate in 
denied areas. SOF will contribute to this enhancement through the “Train and Advise” 
concept, which is well-known to SOF. Based on this concept, SOF will train and advise 
existing intelligence officers or newly recruited intelligence officers to operate in areas 
under enemy or unfriendly control. The concept will teach intelligence officers the 
rudimentary skills of SOF, such as weapons handling, fire and maneuver, and medical first 
aid.92 The support is conducted on a case-by-case basis and the skills imparted will enable 
intelligence officers at minimum cost. The support will not require any change to the C2 
structure of either the intelligence services or SOF. Moreover, the legal authorities to 
execute this option are also already in place. Figure 3 depicts the outside support delivered 
by SOF to the military intelligence services, enabling them to build a paramilitary 
capability. 
 
Figure 3. Option 1—Train and Advise.  
                                                 
92 Danish SOF has previously provided this type of support to the Intelligence Community 
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b. Option Two—Integrated Support 
The Integrated Support option can integrate SOF into the structure of the military 
intelligence services, under their command and control, and working under their mandate 
to support operations in denied areas. In this option, SOF is a part of the military 
intelligence services, enabling their intelligence operations in denied areas. As mentioned 
in Chapter 2 (see p. 19) an interdepartmental steering group is already in place to task and 
supervise the intelligence services including, in this option, SOF. Furthermore, within the 
intelligence system, the statutory authority to conduct intelligence operations is also 
already in place, providing not only the intelligence services, but also SOF the legal ground 
to conduct information gathering missions. To avoid too much dependence on the 
knowledge of intelligence case officers concerning proper ways to integrate SOF into 
intelligence operations, both the military intelligence services and SOF must develop a 
clear understanding on how to use SOF in these operations. In this option, SOF should not 
be used poorly, providing only force protection for intelligence personnel operating in 
denied areas. They must be deeply integrated into the information collection process in 
ways determined by the designated intelligence officer. Moreover, in this option, SOF can 
also contribute to functional areas of intelligence operations by, for example, discretely or 
covertly emplacing technical devices (SIGINT/ IMINT) as a part of the overall intelligence 
mission. In addition, SOF can select safe houses and help the case officer with the 
identification and recruitment of HUMINT sources. Even though the described support is, 
to some extent, within the capabilities of SOF, it will most likely require supplementary 
education and training for the deployed SOF operators, and it will require SOF to select 
operators that fit the job or mission profile. Figure 4 depicts SOF being integrated into the 
military intelligence service.  
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Figure 4. Option 2—Integrated Support. 
c. Option Three—Independent Entity 
The Independent Entity option utilizes SOF as an independent actor collecting 
information. In this option, a currently non-existing, interdepartmental steering group 
should be created to direct SOF’s information collection operations to meet national 
intelligence requirements. This overarching group tasks SOF. To be clear, the group directs 
operations but it does not command nor control SOF nor the military intelligence services. 
Both remain under military command and control. At minimum, this group must 
understand all of the intelligence requirements and SOF capabilities to properly task SOF. 
Only with this knowledge can this group effectively harmonize intelligence operations for 
the military intelligence services and SOF. Another issue that needs attention in this option 
is the statutory authority for SOF to conduct information collection operations in foreign 
regions. Currently, there are two ways in which small-state SOF can independently operate 
to collect information: mandated missions or mission readiness exercises such as 
36 
Flintlock.93 These two options are insufficient and do not provide SOF the adequate legal 
authority to conduct information gathering operations in regions of national interest.   
As an independent information provider SOF enriches the information ecosystem 
and thereby national decision making. Moreover, SOF can operate more independently in 
small groups for extended periods in an austere environment. In this option, SOF is scalable 
and can, as an example, be utilized to confirm or deny information collected by other 
intelligence assets. This option often requires a (semi-)permanent SOF presence in an area 
of national interest reducing SOF’s availability for other missions. Through presence, SOF 
can identify social networks, prominent community influencers and their vulnerabilities, 
and the local perception of legitimacy. In short, SOF can act as “global scouts” and thus 
provide decision-makers with strategic insight. This concept has previously been utilized 
by Belgian SOF.94 Figure 5 depicts SOF as an independent entity within the information 
ecosystem alongside the military intelligence service and the other actors.  
                                                 
93 Head of Commander Advisory Group NLSOCOM, personal interview; Flintlock is an annual 
regional exercise among African, allied and U.S. counterterrorism forces, directed by the Chairman of the 
Joint Chief of Staff and sponsored by U.S. Africa Command. Exercise Flintlock is designed to foster 
regional cooperation to enable African partners to stabilize regions of North and West Africa, while 
reducing sanctuary and support for violent extremist organizations 
94 Pierre D. “Sovereignty and Complexity: Strategic Sense for SOF Operations in Niger.” 
(Unpublished article, last modified, 2018.) PDF file. 
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Figure 5. Option 3—Independent Entity  
2. Analyzing the Options  
The following sections define the selection criteria and uses matrices to highlight 
the main advantages and disadvantages of the three options. 
a. Selection Criteria 
Partially based on feedback obtained from interviewees, who also verified the 
validity of the three options, the authors chose and defined five selection criteria previously 
identified and defined in Chapter II: 
1. Efficient and effective: Efficiency is defined as achieving maximum 
productivity with minimum wasted effort or expense. In comparison, 
effectiveness is defined as success in producing a desired or intended 
result. 
2. Command and Control (C2): U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) 
defines it as “The exercise of authority and direction by a properly 
designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the 
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accomplishment of the mission.”95 Nevertheless, command and control 
can be separated and the definition of command is authority and 
responsibility, and control a steering and supervisory function.   
3. Suitability: Suitability is defined as the quality of being right or 
appropriate for a particular purpose, situation, task, or mission. The 
definition also includes speed of implementation. 
4. Availability: Defined as the availability of personnel, equipment, and 
facilities with regards to specific ways in which SOF can be employed.  
5. Sustainability: The ability to maintain a certain rate or level of capacity 
and capabilities, and avoiding depletion of resources. The definition also 
includes avoiding mission creep that may undermine standing NATO SOF 
responsibilities. 
b. Analyzing Advantages and Disadvantages 
Based on the identified challenges and gaps within the intelligence ecosystem, 
specifically within the military intelligence services, the following section analyzes and 
lists the advantages and disadvantages of the three options using the selection criteria.  
The identified intelligence challenges and gaps are: (1) Need for more cooperation 
and additional information providers; (2) Bureaucratic rigidity (inflexibility); (3) 
Inadequate capabilities to operate in denied areas; (4) Insufficient numbers of personnel to 
fully meet intelligence requirements; (5) Intelligence “blind spots” as a result of the 
aforementioned challenges and gaps. 
The following tables highlight the main advantages and disadvantages when 
analyzing the three options. The analysis starts with the identified challenges and gaps, and 
then applies the selection criteria to determine the advantages and disadvantages.  
                                                 
95 Joint Chiefs of Staff, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, (Washington, DC: Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 2018), http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf?ver=2018-
09-28-100314-687 
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Table 1. Advantages and Disadvantages When Option 1 is 
Analyzed Using the Selection Criteria. 











The option does not address this gap 












- Least costly option for SOF 
because it is within SOF´s 
capabilities and requires a 
minimum of SOF capacity. 
- Facilities already in place to 
support the option. 
- Unknown whether the current intelligence 
officers coming from a different organizational 
culture and different way of operating will be 
able to gain the skill sets needed to operate in 
denied areas. 
- Operating in denied areas require skill sets 
that take time to develop.  
- Does not address systemic issues. 
Command & 
Control  
- No change in C2. Support will 
be conducted on a case-by-
case basis. 
- The analytical 
capacity/capability already 
exists within the military 
intelligence services. 
- No unity of command between trainer (SOF) 





- Military Intel services will be 
able to work in denied areas.  
- SOF and the military 
intelligence service can 
implement this option very 
fast. 
- Unknown whether the current intelligence 
officers coming from a different organizational 
culture and different way of operating will be 
able to gain the skill sets needed to operate in 
denied areas. 
- Intelligence personnel capable to operate in 
denied areas will take considerable time. 
 
Availability - SOF is currently available, and 
it is assessed that this option 
will not exceed SOF availability.  
- Since not under same C2, if SOF is occupied 
conducting other operations, this option may 
not be feasible.  
- This option will mainly be launched on a 
case-by-case basis, and therefore relies 
heavily on SOF availability.  
Sustainability - Expected to require a 
minimum of SOF involvement, 
and therefore sustainable. 
- Over the long haul, military 








their own trainers and SOF 






















- Training intelligence officers 
to work in denied areas will 
enhance their ability to cover 
the blind spots. 
- The capacity of the military intelligence 
services will not increase, which limits the 




SOF are not a part of the intelligence C2 structure in this option. Support is given 





- The option can be 
implemented immediately. 
- Adequately covering blind spots will take 
considerable time. 
 
Availability - Limited resources required for 
SOF to train and advise the 
military intel services. High 
availability.  
 
Sustainability - If SOF have excess capacity, 
the support can be easily 
sustained. 
- Since SOF and the military intelligence 
service are two different organizations, this 
can potentially cause the support to be 













Table 2. Advantages and Disadvantages When Option 2 is 
Analyzed Using the Selection Criteria. 












- Integrated SOF expand the 
numbers of information 
providers. 
- SOF must achieve proficiency (new skill sets) 
in HUMINT operations through effective 
selection, education, and training which will 
take additional time.  
Command & 
Control 
- SOF will operate under the C2 
of the military intelligence 
services.  
- Unity of command and effort.  
- The intelligence requirements will be 
directed from the existing system. 
- Limited SOF perspective/insight due to 






- SOF can select, train, and 
educate SOF information 
collectors to ensure 
proficiency. 
- It will require additional training for SOF to 
be proficient.  
Availability - The availability of SOF 
depends on excess capacity or 
repurposing SOF. 
- SOF have ongoing assigned tasks. This 
option may undermine ongoing SOF missions. 
Sustainability - With excess capacity within 







- SOF can expand the numbers 
of information providers and 
thus enhance flexibility. 
- SOF must achieve proficiency (new skill sets) 
in HUMINT operations through effective 
selection, education, and training which will 
take additional time.  
Command & 
Control 
- SOF will operate under the C2 
of the military intelligence 
services.  
- Unity of command and effort, 
resulting in more flexibility 
between SOF and military 
intelligence service 
- The intelligence requirements will be 






- SOF can learn from the 
intelligence officers which will 
increase the speed of 
implementation.  
- SOF will integrate into an existing 
bureaucracy which can hamper SOF´s 
flexibility. 
Availability - The availability of SOF 
depends on excess capacity or 
repurposing SOF. 
- SOF have ongoing assigned tasks. 
Sustainability - With excess capacity this 







- SOF have the skill set to work 
in denied areas.  
- SOF operators are often 
mature individuals with the 
- Intel officer will require training on SOF 







ability to adapt to the 
circumstances. 
- Minimum training required to 
implement this option. 
- SOF can increase the 




- Unity of command and control 
which facilitates operations. 
- The intelligence requirements will be 






- Analytical capacity already in 
place. 
- SOF can operate under 
existing intelligence statutory 
authority which will increase 
the speed of implementation. 
- By observing intelligence 
officers and on the job training 
SOF can learn the skills needed 
to operate as information 
collectors. 
- The full potential of this option depends on 
the case manager using SOF to their full 
potential. 
- Intel officer will require training on SOF 
capabilities and limitations. 
Availability - If SOF have excess capacity, 
the resources can quickly be 
used to help IS work in denied 
areas.  
- Risk of mission creep for SOF. 
Sustainability - With excess capacity this 
option can be sustained. 
- Since SOF and the military intelligence 
service are two different organizations, this 
can potentially cause the support to be 









- SOF provides more personnel. 
- Can be implemented on 
relatively short notice. 
- Moderate cost if SOF has 
excess capacity. 
- SOF must possess the skill set to conduct the 
clandestine/discrete operations which might 
require additional training. 
Command & 
Control 
- Unity of command and control 
because SOF are integrated 
into the military intelligence 
services. 





- Analytical capacity already in 
place. 
- Will enhance the military 
intelligence services coverage 
of blind spots. 
- SOF can also increase 
capacity. 
- Intelligence officer know how to utilize SOF’s 
full potential. 
- SOF operators must have the proper 
characteristics, training, and skillsets to 
enable and conduct these types of 
intelligence operations. They need to fit the 
mission’s profile. 
Availability - If SOF have excess capacity, 
using SOF will not affect other 
SOF missions. 
- SOF are a scarce resource with ongoing 







Sustainability - Can be sustained if excess 
capacity exists. 
- The support can potentially be terminated 
due to other SOF priorities.  
5) Intelligence 
“blind spots” 






- Using the full potential of SOF 
under a knowledgeable 
intelligence officer will be cost 
effective  
- If the military intelligence 
services are strengthened 
numerically, SOF can support a 
more persistent presence in 
denied areas. 
- Minimum training required to 
implement this option. 
- Intel officer must understand SOF 
capabilities, which will require training on SOF 
capabilities and limitations. 
Command & 
Control  





- If SOF can work 
“independently” under an 
intelligence officer. This option 
has potential to cover blind 
spots. 
- SOF operators need to have the proper 
characteristics, mindset, and skill sets to 
conduct these operations. 
Availability - The availability of SOF 
depends on excess capacity or 
repurposing SOF 
- SOF are a scarce resource with ongoing 
NATO tasks.  
Sustainability - If SOF have excess capacity, 
the support can be sustained. 
- Since SOF and the military intelligence 
service are two different organizations, this 
can potentially cause the support to be 




















Table 3. Advantages and Disadvantages When Option 3 is 
Analyzed Using the Selection Criteria. 












- Limited state actors 
(embassies) in denied and 
permissive areas. SOF can 
potentially contribute to 
collecting information in these 
areas.   
- SOF must achieve proficiency (new skill sets) 
in HUMINT operations through effective 
selection, education, and training.  
- The creation of SOF as a strategic actor can 




- When operating as an 
independent entity, SOF can 
remain flexible and bring a new 
perspective to the ecosystem.  
- Currently, there is no steering group that 
direct SOF in regards to info collection for 
national decision making. 
- An interdepartmental steering group to 






- SOF can select, train, and 
educate the information 
collectors to ensure 
proficiency. This may require 
intelligence services’ 
assistance. 
- Currently, no steering group to direct SOF. 
The implementation of such a group takes 
time.    
- SOF operators, as independent actors, need 
to possess both the tactical and strategic 
proficiency to conduct these information 
gathering operations.   
Availability - The availability of SOF 
depends on excess capacity or 
repurposing SOF. 







- SOF can expand the numbers 
of information providers and 
thus enhance flexibility.   
- SOF will operate 
independently and thus not be 
hampered by intelligence 
services’ bureaucracy.  
- Flexibility between SOF and the military 
intelligence services is lost due to the absence 
of unity of command. 
Command & 
Control 
- SOF are able to operate from 
normal C2 structures.  
- Currently, no steering mechanism to direct 
SOF, and implementation of such mechanism 
takes time.  
- This option will require significantly more 
coordination and deconfliction between the 
Intelligence services and SOF to prevent 
“intelligence failures,” thereby reducing 





- SOF can work proactively to 
identify emerging threats by 
being a 
(semi-)permanent presence in 
regions of national interest. 
- Currently, the legal authority for SOF to 
work as an independent entity is not clear.   
- There is political risk in having SOF working 







- Determination of the statutory authority for 
SOF can be time consuming. 
- Creation of a steering mechanism to direct 
SOF outside the military intelligence services 
will most likely take time.  
Availability - If SOF have excess capacity, 
this option can be executed 
within given resources. 
- SOF have ongoing missions.  
- SOF are a scarce resource, mission 
prioritization is needed.   
Sustainability - SOF have the number of 
personnel and logistical 
support to sustain a  
(semi-)permanent presence in 
regions of national interest. 
- Prolonged (semi-)permanent presence 








- SOF are tactically proficient to 
operate in denied areas.  
- SOF can increase the 
information collection in 
denied areas. 
- Requirement to develop proper legal 
authority for SOF to operate in denied areas 
for intelligence missions.  
- Absence of capabilities within SOF to 
provide essential prerequisites such as cover 
for identity and action, and to analyze 















The option will not strengthen the capacity within the military intelligence services. However, 










- In permissive areas use 
mission readiness exercises or 
ongoing missions to employ 
SOF in uncovered regions. 
- Where the intelligence 
services lack resources in their 
functional areas, SOF can 
conduct HUMINT, SIGINT, 
IMINT, etc.  
- SOF can contribute to the 
intelligence picture to help 
operationalize preventive and 
integrated approaches. 
- To maintain proficiency SOF must educate 
and train for Intel tasks and evolve into being 
both efficient and effective in collecting 
information from permissive and denied 
areas. SOF personnel must evolve from a 
traditional SOF operator to an effective 
strategic level information collector.  
For example, SOF must:  
• Know the roles of NGOs and interagency.
• Gain regional and cultural knowledge.








- Through (semi-)permanent 




- SOF will work under C2 of 
SOCOM, which will ensure 
unity of command and effort. 
- Currently, no system to direct and supervise 
SOF for strategic level info collection. 
- The creation of such a system can take 
considerable time. 
- Integrating SOF collected information may 





- SOF are flexible and thus are 
able to cover the blind spots. 
- Currently, no steering mechanism to direct 
SOF. Implementation of such a mechanism 
takes time.    
Availability - The availability of SOF 
depends on excess capacity or 
repurposing SOF. 
- SOF have ongoing missions. 
- Risk of mission creep. 
Sustainability - SOF have the personnel and 
logistical support to sustain a  
(semi-)permanent presence in 
regions of national interest. 
- Prolonged (semi-)permanent presence 
might drain SOF´s capacity to do other tasks. 
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3. Prerequisite Factors Affecting the Results of the Analysis
The preceding matrices highlight the advantages and disadvantages of the various 
options but there are other factors that affect the results of the analysis. Clarification of 
these factors enable a sound assessment of the options in Chapter IV.   
a. Direction, Processing, and Dissemination
The analysis focuses on how SOF can support national-level information 
collection. However, to utilize the independent entity option (option 3) requires that 
processing and dissemination mechanisms must be ironed out to enable a smoothly running 
intelligence cycle.96 To use SOF as an independent entity to support national decision-
making seems easy, but in practice it is likely to prove complex. The creation of an 
interdepartmental steering group with knowledge of national intelligence requirements and 
capabilities is needed to ensure SOF information missions are properly directed. This 
interdepartmental group must ensure that SOF operate in conjunction with other 
intelligence instruments in the system. In practice, the national SOCOM will retain 
command and control and the interdepartmental steering group will task and direct SOF 
information collection missions under option 3. Currently, such an interdepartmental 
steering group does not exist in Denmark nor in the Netherland. However, to achieve the 
harmonization needed to effectively utilize SOF as an independent entity within the 
informational ecosystem, the authors see the creation of such an overarching authority as 
imperative. While building the structure needed for SOF to operate effectively within the 
current and future security environments, SOF’s operational flexibility within this structure 
must be maintained. Furthermore, due to a lack of analytical capacity within SOF, decision 
makers must determine how the collected information will be processed and disseminated. 
To whom should SOF pass the information and how will future intelligence products be 
disseminated? Currently, only one option to ensure that SOF collected information 
contribute to the creation of a better overall intelligence picture exists. The information 
must be processed and disseminated by the military intelligence services.  
96 The Intelligence Cycle consists of Direction, Collection, Processing, and Dissemination. 
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b. Statutory Authority 
Currently there are two legal ways in which SOF from the Netherlands or Denmark 
can obtain information independently.97 The currently legal ways are: 
• Mandated missions that allow for information collection in the area of 
operations as a part of force protection.  
• Capacity-building exercises like Flintlock98 that provide an opportunity to 
collect information through local partner units. 
If one of these ways is not feasible then a new statutory authority for SOF 
information collecting missions is necessary. If SOF is integrated into the structure of the 
military intelligence services (option 2) then SOF can operate under their statutory 
authorities. The legal ground for utilizing the independent entity option (option 3) is 
problematic.   
c. Denied (non-permissive) Areas vs. Permissive Areas 
Whereas SOF, obviously, will conduct option one: train and assist, in their home 
countries, they can execute option two: integrated support, and option three: independent 
entity, in both permissive and non-permissive environments. Both environments have 
distinct characteristics. In a permissive environment, information providers such as SOF 
can operate in an open manner—overt. They have complete freedom of movement and 
action, and easy access to host nation (military) networks. In permissive environments, 
information collectors can operate under their own identity, conducting routine actions. 
They neither have to rely on sophisticated covers for identity nor for action.  
Under non-permissive circumstances, information collectors are in constant danger 
of being “compromised,” risking the entire information collection mission. This forces 
collectors to operate “under the radar” clandestine or covertly, which significantly limits 
                                                 
97 Deputy Director Danish Defense Intelligence Service, interview, Copenhagen, 03 September 2018.  
98 Flintlock is an annual regional exercise among African, allied and U.S. counterterrorism forces, 
directed by the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff and sponsored by U.S. Africa Command. Exercise 
Flintlock is designed to foster regional cooperation to enable African partners to stabilize regions of North 
and West Africa, while reducing sanctuary and support for violent extremist organizations. 
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their freedom of movement and action. Moreover, when collectors are operating in the 
open, they cannot use their own identity while conducting covert or discrete information 
collection operations. They require sophisticated “covers” for identity and actions to 
operate in denied foreign regions. Information collecting organizations will require 
adequate knowledge and capabilities to develop and provide these “covers,” and maintain 
them before, during, and after the operation. 
d. SOF Proficiency 
Regardless of whether SOF are integrated into the military intelligence services 
(option 2) or operate as an independent entity (option 3), it is essential that SOF possess 
the capabilities to operate as a national level information providers. Operating as a strategic 
instrument, SOF must maintain relations and cooperation with other strategic actors such 
as ambassadors, Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, and NGOs. To operate under these 
circumstances, SOF operators need to possess additional skills. Not all SOF operators will 
be suitable for information collection missions. To maintain long-term proficiency, SOF 
need to select, educate and train individuals for this new mission. A trajectory must be in 
place that transforms selected SOF operators into experienced information collectors that 
match the needs of information missions. Figure 6 depicts desired characteristics and skill 
sets for such a transformation.   
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Figure 6. Trajectory from SOF Operator to Strategic Information Collector. 
C. SUMMARY OF THE ANALYSIS 
SOF can help fill the intelligence shortfalls either through training of intelligence 
officers (option 1) or by integrating SOF into the military intelligence services (option 2). 
In addition, SOF can potentially operate independently outside the intelligence system 
(option 3) and thereby contribute to the information ecosystem. A narrative of each 
option’s advantages and disadvantages based on the preceding matrices is found in Chapter 






IV. RESEARCH FINDINGS, POLICY IMPLICATIONS, 
RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS 
The primary objective of this capstone is to explore how small European state SOF 
can complement their national intelligence services, which due to limited resources, small 
sizes, and limited capabilities, are challenged in several ways. In short, the intelligence 
services are limited in their ability to meet the intelligence requirements. 
A. RESEARCH FINDINGS 
This study began with a review of the relevant literature99 and current Dutch and 
Danish security policy documents to determine how scholars and policy-makers from both 
Europe and the United States assesses the future of special operations and whether SOF 
can potentially contribute to generating more insight for national decision making. Former 
USSOCOM Commander General Votel asserted that SOF’s greatest value lies in 
generating more decision space and strategic options for policy-makers.100 Joseph Nye, an 
American political scientist, has stated that “contextual intelligence, the ability to 
understand an evolving environment and capitalize on trends, will become a crucial skill 
in enabling [political] leaders to convert power resources into successful strategies.”101 In 
sum, the reviewed literature emphasized the importance of information and understanding 
and the need to meet the intelligence requirements of national leaders.  
Chapter I explored the current European security environment and determined an 
increased instability in the regions surrounding Europe. Russia’s renewed aspirations to 
become a great power once again have led to tensions on Europe’s eastern flank, while the 
ongoing conflicts in the Middle Eastern and North African regions are increasing the 
threats on its southern flank. Threats such as hybrid warfare, terrorism, and migration 
directly or indirectly threaten the national interests of small European states and thus affect 
                                                 
99 The complete Literature Review can be found in Appendix 1. 
100 USSOCOM, Directorate of Force Management and Development Concept Development and 
Integration Office. Special Operations Forces Operating Concept: A Whitepaper to Guide Special 
Operations Force Development, 2016 (Tampa, Florida). 
101 Joseph S. Nye, The Future of Power. Perseus Books Group, 2011, xvii. 
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their security. The chapter further reviewed the Dutch and Danish security policies,102 
which expressed an increased need for preventive and integrated strategies in the 
aforementioned regions to advance national security interests. Especially in North Africa, 
it seems that in the future Europe will need to cope with the security challenges with 
significantly less help of the United States. Inevitably, the increased instability around 
Europe, the global geopolitical shifts, and the Danish and Dutch desire for preventive and 
integrated foreign security policies will increase small European states’ need for nationally 
generated intelligence 
Chapter II assessed the small-states intelligence system’s ability to meet national 
requirements, specifically focusing on military intelligence services, to determine what 
challenges currently exist? The chapter furthermore identified the role of intelligence in 
the development of national security strategies and how the military intelligence services, 
as the primary collectors of information from foreign regions, are organized to meet the 
intelligence requirements. Based on the security issues identified in Chapter I, it was 
determined that the new intelligence requirements stretch the already limited intelligence 
resources of the military intelligence services beyond their ability. This creates intelligence 
gaps that impede the development and implementation of national security strategies. 
Following a series of interviews, the authors identified challenges: (1) Need for more 
cooperation and additional information providers; (2) Bureaucratic rigidity (inflexibility); 
(3) Inadequate capabilities to operate in denied areas; (4) Insufficient numbers of personnel 
to fully meet intelligence requirements; (5) Intelligence “blind spots” as a result of the 
aforementioned challenges. 
Based on the identified gaps, in Chapter III the authors analyzed how SOF can 
reinforce the intelligence communities of small states and determined that three distinct 
options exist.  
                                                 
102 Danish Government; Foreign and Security Policy 2017-18, (Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 2017), http://um.dk/da/udenrigspolitik/aktuelle-emner/udenrigs-og-sikkerhedspolitisk-strategi-
2017-18; Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Update International Security Strategy: Turbulente Tijden in 
een Instabiele Omgeving. (The Hague, NL: MoFA, 2014). 
https://www.defensie.nl/downloads/brieven/2014/11/14/beleidsbrief-internationale-veiligheid. 
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• Option 1—Train and Advise the Military Intelligence Services 
• Option 2—Integrated Support 
• Option 3—Independent Entity 
Through five selection criteria—1) efficiency and effectiveness, 2) command and 
control, 3) suitability (including speed of implementation,) 4) availability, and 5) 
sustainability—each option was analyzed to determine its advantages and disadvantages. 
The following sections summarize the main advantages and disadvantages of the three 
options.103 
1. Option 1—Train and Advise the Military Intelligence Services.  
The Train and Advise option, where SOF support developing paramilitary 
capabilities within the Dutch and Danish intelligence services, enabling them to operate in 
denied areas, partially meets the intelligence requirement to collect information from the 
areas of national interest. However, it only addresses one of the five identified challenges. 
This option’s potential consists solely of training and advising the military intelligence 
services in building a capability to operate in denied areas and therefore only addresses that 
specific challenge. Training existing intelligence officers to capably work in denied areas, 
is a feasible option, but it will require time consuming training, which may limit the 
applicability of the option. Recruiting new intelligence officers with the desirable skill sets 
and qualifications is possible, but this will also be costly and time-consuming. In other 
words, although senior leaders can implement this option very fast, the effect of training 
military intelligence personnel’s proficiency to operate in denied areas will require 
considerable time. The resources needed for SOF to execute this option will be minimal 
and are assessed to be available within the current SOF structure without undermining other 
ongoing tasks.  
                                                 
103 The complete analysis can be found in Chapter III.  
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2. Option 2—Integrated Support 
The Integrated Support option requires SOF to integrate into the structure of the 
military intelligence services, fully under their command and control, and thus work under 
their statutory authority. The option enables the military intelligence services to conduct 
intelligence operations in denied areas and has the potential to address all the identified 
challenges. To fully exploit the option, SOF must deeply integrate into the military 
intelligence service rather than only provide force protection to intelligence officers. The 
potential can only be exploited if the intelligence officer has the necessary knowledge about 
the use of SOF. If this is the case, the option will address all the identified challenges of 
the military intelligence services, and as a result, also have the potential to help cover the 
intelligence blind spots. To ensure not only tactical but also strategic proficiency, SOF 
must have the proper capabilities and their operators the adequate characteristics and skill 
sets to conduct intelligence operations. In other words, SOF need to fit the mission profile. 
Furthermore, this option enhances tactical flexibility between the military intelligence 
services and SOF while conducting intelligence operations, reducing the need for 
significant coordination and risk of intelligence failure. However, it will not improve 
flexibility on the strategic level between the steering group and military intelligence 
services. Moreover, due to the level of integration between SOF and the military 
intelligence service, SOF’s distinct angle of insight, enriching the intelligence product, will 
be limited. With a SOF-knowledgeable intelligence officer, SOF is more likely to receive 
the freedom of action to operate effectively under the military intelligence services’ 
statutory authorities. With this freedom, SOF will collect HUMINT (situational awareness) 
and contribute to the intelligence picture. Since SOF will work under the command and 
control of the military intelligence services, and thus under their statutory authority, one 
major advantage is that the legal authority for this option already exists. In addition, 
implementation can take place when the need arises, without wasting valuable time. 
Depending on the extent and scale to which the support is given, this option might require 
prioritization of the available SOF resources. The Integrated Support option is likely more 
congruent with operating in denied areas where the intelligence services are ill-suited to 
operate alone. 
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3.  Option 3—Independent Entity  
The Independent Entity option, in which SOF operate as an independent actor 
within the information ecosystem, can potentially address all the identified challenges. 
Furthermore, an independent SOF entity, will add fresh eyes and ears to the ecosystem and 
thus address the challenge requiring additional information providers. Based on their 
characteristics and skill sets, SOF, through (semi-)permanent presence in permissive areas 
of national interests, are able to gain HUMINT and infer public perception based on trusted 
relations developed over time. Although SOF are already partially proficient to conduct 
information collecting operations, they still require different characteristics, training, and 
skill sets to meet the mission profile. Moreover, SOF can be uniquely positioned to discern 
real intentions of key actors and to predict likely future developments, potentially covering 
blind spots. SOF will enhance strategic flexibility for the currently existing steering group. 
However, SOF as an independent information provider will require significant 
coordination and deconfliction to reduce the risk of intelligence failure. There is a risk that 
this option can reduce SOF’s ability to conduct ongoing missions. Even though the role as 
strategic information collectors is not yet a doctrinal task for SOF, this option can be 
implemented quite quickly by repurposing SOF or using existing excess capacity. 
Additionally, this option requires the creation of a high-level steering mechanism that is 
knowledgeable about national intelligence requirements to properly task SOF information 
collection operations and, preferably, military intelligence services’ operations as well. The 
steering group will task and SOCOM will command and control. The legal authorities for 
SOF to operate as an independent entity will most likely be challenging to obtain if SOF 
cannot operate under an already existing mandate. Moreover, the full potential of this 
option will require policy makers to gain knowledge and trust in SOF´s ability to accept 
the risk associated with information operations in non-permissive environments. Gaining 
the trust of policymakers, creating the interdepartmental steering group, and establishing 
statutory authorities will be time consuming and are not guaranteed. The Independent 
Entity option likely applies best to permissive areas.  
56 
4. Answers to the Research Question 
This study is focused on answering the research question “How can SOF from small 
European states most efficiently and effectively contribute to the intelligence capacity 
needed to forecast and counter threats from foreign regions?” Based on the research 
findings, there are two answers to the research question, depending on the relative value 
one places on efficiency vs. effectiveness. 
a. Most Efficient  
The research findings show that when SOF are dedicated to work under the 
command and control of the military intelligence services, and thus under their statutory 
authority, the major advantages are that the legal authority to operationalize the option 
already exists. For this reason, although additional training and integration have to take 
place, implementation can be almost immediate without wasting valuable time and 
resources. In sum, the Integrated Support option (option 2) achieves maximum productivity 
with minimum wasted effort or expense, which is the very definition of efficiency (see 
Chapter I p. 9).  
b. Most Effective 
If the desired result of SOF´s contribution to the national intelligence capacity is to 
counter as many challenges in the current intelligence system as possible, this study shows 
that both option 2 and 3 address five out of five identified challenges, but in different ways. 
Accordingly, this study demonstrates that a combination of option 2 and 3 is an effective 
way for SOF to contribute to national intelligence capacity. Although SOF have value in 
both options, in permissive areas SOF will have more relative value as an independent 
entity; whereas in denied areas SOF’s relative value is higher when integrated into military 
intelligence services’ operations 
B. IMPLICATIONS 
The research has shown that SOF are capable of information collection at the 
strategic level, but also that the implementation of SOF as information collectors has 
implications.  
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If SOF are to conduct information collection missions in support of the national 
decision-making three preconditions are essential. First, to establish national-level support 
for using SOF as strategic information collectors, SOF senior-leaders need to educate 
national leaders about SOF’s capabilities and limitations. The best way of doing this is to 
include the role as strategic information collectors into national SOF doctrine. With clarity 
soundly expressed in doctrine, SOF leaders will create a proper foundation for SOF’s 
contributions at the strategic level. The desired outcome of such efforts is to increase 
national decision-makers’ knowledge about SOF and thereby generate political will to 
utilize SOF strategically. Second, national leaders must recognize the requirement for SOF 
to enhance national intelligence capacity as a prerequisite to design effective security 
policies and strategies. Such a sense of recognition increases the likelihood that the 
necessary statutory authority is created. Third, SOF must be proficient as information 
collectors. In essence, the use of SOF as strategic level information collectors relies on a 
trinity of political will, statutory authority, and SOF´s proficiency. 
Small states, such as the Netherlands and Denmark, acknowledge the relevance of 
information to enable analysis and national-level decision-making in their policy 
documents.104 Information is viewed as a crucial enabler for small states’ foreign security 
efforts by providing understanding of the factors that drive future security threats. Based 
on the findings, the authors recommend that small states with limited resources pick the 
low-hanging fruit to improve information collection. Currently, the Integrated Support 
option (option 2) represents this fruit. The analysis shows that SOF with their existing 
capabilities efficiently and effectively can add to the information picture in both denied 
and permissive areas and thereby provide decision makers with more information to design 
preventive and integrated foreign security policies and strategies. SOF should strive to 
provide decision makers the ability to look over the horizon for emerging threats. This will 
require a (semi-)permanent presence in the areas of national interest to collect information. 
                                                 
104 Danish Government; Foreign and Security Policy 2017-18, (Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 2017), http://um.dk/da/udenrigspolitik/aktuelle-emner/udenrigs-og-sikkerhedspolitisk-strategi-
2017-18; Dutch Ministry of Defence. Houvast in een Onzekere Wereld: Lijnen van Ontwikkeling in het 




A combination of SOF integrated into intelligence operations and operating independently 
as information providers will meet these requirements. In such a combination, SOF will 
provide information beneficial to national decision-making using their network and thereby 
enabling national leaders to act preventively and pre-emptively. However, in both options 
the information provided by SOF will still processed and disseminated by the military 
intelligence services.  
Though assisting in filling the identified intelligence gaps is important, SOF must 
still conduct other missions as part of NATO. SOF leaders should approach the new 
information collection mission cautiously. When employing SOF as information 
collectors, national leaders should continuously review which missions provide the most 
strategic value for their country. Moreover, although small European states have many 
similarities, their information ecosystems differ and they should utilize the suggested 
options in ways that best deal with their specific intelligence challenges. Even though the 
authors assessed option 2 and a combination of option 2 and 3 to be, respectively, the most 
efficient and effective ways to contribute to the intelligence capacity of small states, 
decision makers have other options. If opportune, they can implement all the described 
options simultaneously or create a hybrid version. In short, the options are not mutually 
exclusive and can be utilized to best fit a nation’s security challenges.  
Implementation of Option 3 has some inherent challenges associated with the need 
to create new authorities. Furthermore, because small states’ SOF are a scarce resource, 
SOF leaders must realize that using SOF as a forward deployed network to enhance 
information collection may result in unintended mission creep105 and unintentionally 
degrade other SOF capabilities.  
Not only has meeting national intelligence requirements become more urgent, 
NATO tasks have also gained importance in the current complex security environment. 
States with limited SOF resources should take a cautious approach when implementing 
new concepts. Through careful assessment, SOF leaders and decision makers can 
                                                 
105 A gradual shift in objectives during military missions, often resulting in an unplanned long-term 
commitment. 
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determine the strategic value of the options and weigh them against current NATO SOF 
responsibilities.  
In addition, it is important not to overestimate what SOF are able to achieve. In 
2016, U.S. Special Operations Command published the “Operating in the Human Domain” 
(OHD) concept. The concept states that SOF are successful in developing strong 
partnerships, but there is no guarantee that these associations will result in support for U.S. 
objectives. SOF and their partners may overemphasize human domain considerations, 
which could lead to the establishment of unrealistic goals and wasteful programs.106 
 Furthermore, some military theorists are particularly skeptical about the strategic 
use of SOF, and others are generally critical of the quest for information superiority. Eliot 
Cohen and Samuel Huntington have argued that elite units, like SOF, risk unintentionally 
and unconsciously conveying an unrealistic picture of the factual situation. Consequently, 
these outputs may generate inadequate perspectives and thus contribute to wrong 
perceptions among policy makers regarding the political problems in a region of national 
interest. By undermining the chain of command and charming the politicians, SOF can 
disrupt the foundation of professional civil-military relations. Furthermore, Cohen and 
Huntington have claimed that the disproportionate reliance on SOF occurs under two 
circumstances. First, when a widely respected political leader shows a personal interest in 
SOF, and second, when SOF overstate their capabilities and offer politicians a solution to 
a politically precarious problem.107  
Additionally, Christopher Kirk states that the pursuit of information superiority also 
has a negative side. It can develop decision paralysis, risk-averse behavior, and 
overreliance on data analysis, and reduce creative and critical thinking. Moreover, it can 
centralize control and execution and, most dangerously, create a false belief that the 
Clausewitzian “fog of war” can be diminished.108  
                                                 
106 USSOCOM; Operating in the Human Domain, 2015 (Tampa, Florida: 2015), 40-41. 
107 Eliot A. Cohen and Samuel P. Huntington, Commandos and Politicians: Elite Military Units in 
Modern Democracies, (Harvard, Centre for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1978). 
108 Christopher J. Kirk, “The Demise of Decision Making How Information Superiority Degrades our 
Ability to Make Decisions,” Journal of National Security Studies, (AUG 6, 2016): 84 – 93. 
60 
C. AREAS OF FUTURE RESEARCH 
Possible areas of future research related to this study are:  
• How SOF select, educate, and train operators for national information 
collection missions?  
• How SOF can be utilized as strategic information collectors and also 
simultaneously influence the environment preventively and preemptively 
as strategic shapers? 
• How the statutory authority for SOF to operate as an independent entity 
can be extended, and how an interdepartmental steering group can be 
created? 
• How can the politician´s knowledge of the military and SOF be improved? 
D. CONCLUSIONS 
This capstone has investigated a possible strategic role for SOF as information 
collectors in support of national decision-making. The analysis has focused on how SOF 
can most efficiently and effectively complement existing information collection in regions 
of national interest to forecast and counter threats from foreign regions. The research 
determined that Denmark and the Netherlands lack sufficient information-collection 
capacity and capabilities, which primarily are based on an increased need for Denmark and 
the Netherlands to generate more information from unstable regions. The increased 
intelligence requirements are a consequence of the complex security situation in and 
around Europe, and an increased Danish and Dutch political focus on areas of national 
interest—specifically in the Middle Eastern and North African regions—that does not 
necessarily coincide with the interests of their strategic partners. In small states, this calls 
for an efficient and effective use of the limited resources capable of collecting information. 
The analysis has shown how small European states can use SOF to enhance and improve 
strategic intelligence enabling decision makers to design better integrated and preventive 
policies and strategies.  
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The analysis suggests that using SOF in support of the military intelligence 
services by integrating SOF into the services structure (Option 2) can be implemented 
immediately making it the most efficient use of SOF. This option requires little 
adaptation by SOF; however, SOF must educate and train the selected operators to be 
proficient. SOF can use excess capacity or repurpose elements of their organization to 
conduct information collection tasks in support of national decision making. But 
depending on the extent of such a task, it may have consequences for SOF´s ability to 
conduct their ongoing missions. Moreover, option 2 is likely more congruent with 
supporting intelligence operations in denied areas because of the intelligence 
services’ capabilities to provide necessary preconditions for operating in these areas.  
Additionally, SOF can be utilized as an independent entity (Option 3) operating in 
permissive areas as part of a forward network to forecast future security challenges. 
However, creating an independent entity to complement the already existing information 
ecosystem does have implications that must be addressed before SOF can effectively 
contribute to strategic level information collection. The two primary challenges associated 
with Option 3 are establishing the legal authorities for SOF to collect information 
independently from foreign areas, and creating an interdepartmental steering group that 
tasks SOF when they operate as an independent entity. This option, however, has the 
potential for SOF to address most of the identified challenges (see Chapter II pp. 24–26). 
Option 3 most likely applies best to permissive areas.  
The findings of this capstone suggest that small states with limited resources can 
utilize existing SOF capabilities to improve information collection. The analysis has 
shown that there is a potential to immediately integrate SOF into the military intelligence 
services maximizing the efficiency of existing resources. However, the findings have 
also shown that there is not one clear solution that addresses all the identified 
challenges and gaps. Which option is most efficient and effective depends on the 
circumstances. Essentially, the identified options are not mutually exclusive and decision 
makers can utilize a combination of options to provide the best solution to address the 
intelligence challenges to better forecast and counter threats from foreign regions. This 
study does not conclude with one clear solution. To exploit SOF’s full potential, a 
com
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combination of options 2 and 3 likely represents the most efficient and effective 
way for SOF to contribute to the national intelligence capacity, in which Option 2 is 
more congruent with denied areas and Option 3 with permissive areas. 
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APPENDIX A.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
This study’s research-question led to four scholarly areas of exploration: 
1) Threats to (small) European states’ security, 
2) Current small European states’ security policies,  
3) The role of intelligence regarding states´ security policies,   
4) SOF’s capabilities to contribute to information collection for national 
decision making.  
The first area relates to the threats posed to small European states, and is extensively 
addressed in the ongoing discussions among Danish and Dutch academics from various 
research institutions; it is also stated in the annual threat assessments published by the 
Danish and Dutch intelligence and security services.109 Among these various scholars, 
there appears to be a broad consensus that the environment is unstable, unpredictable, and 
that different threats are rapidly emerging in various areas.110  
The second area relates to the security policies of small European states and 
commonly is seen in official policy papers, articles written by private think-tanks, and 
publications from independent research institutions. A general theme among the senior 
political leadership is their focus on the necessity to use all of their instruments of power 
to preserve and benefit national interests and influence.111 In the 2016 review of Denmark´s 
foreign and security policy, former ambassador Taksoe-Jensen assesses that: “the political 
power is gradually being dispersed to an increasing number of actors, many of them non-
                                                 
109 Lauder, Masters of Chaos: The Application of Political Warfare by the Russian Federation in the 
Contemporary Operating Environment; Dutch Ministry of Defense, MIVD Jaarverslag 2016; Dutch 
Ministry of Defense, MIVD Jaarverslag 2017; Danish Police Intelligence Service, Assessment of the 
Terrorist Threat to Denmark; Lars Findsen, 2017 Threat Assessment  
110 Maarten Gehem et al., Special Operations Forces: schaduwkrijgers in het licht van de toekomst, 
(The Hague, NL: The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, 2015), 
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state. In Europe’s periphery, continuous crises are producing instability and migration.”112 
The former ambassador further argues that, “a changing world demands a focused, well-
coordinated and integrated security and foreign policy, based on clear strategic thinking 
about which national objectives to place at the very forefront of states´ international 
engagements.”113 In addition to this Danish shift toward more emphasis on national 
interests, Dutch political leaders also have articulated a move in a similar direction. In the 
government policy accord 2017–2021 of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Dutch leaders 
emphasize national values and interests.114 In addition, Dutch politicians have stated that 
active foreign policy is of national interest.115 While international crises directly influence 
national security, small European states are now focused on conflict resolution and 
prevention in the regions surrounding Europe.116 Due to political aversion to large-scale 
reactive (military) interventions, states have begun to prefer an indirect preventive 
approach to foreign policy. They prefer to prevent conflicts from happening, rather than 
intervene in conflicts that have escalated to a level that exceeds their ability to effectively 
respond.117 
The third area relates to the role of intelligence in developing national security 
policies and the ability of the national Defense/Military Intelligence Services to effectively 
and efficiently provide Danish and Dutch decision makers with the needed intelligence. In 
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a 2005 research study conducted by an intelligence and security research group appointed 
by the Dutch MoD, researchers identified several deficiencies within the Dutch MISS.118 
In 2010, these deficiencies were again addressed by Erwin Muller in his book, Intelligence 
and Security Services, in which he stated that the findings of the 2005 research were still 
valid and of vital importance.119 Additionally, the Dutch Minister of Defense stated in the 
foreword of the 2017 MISS report that reinforcement of the Intelligence and Security 
Service was of utmost importance.120 With this acknowledgement, the Netherlands 
recognizes the lack of capacity and calls for reinforcement or expansion to increase 
information collection.121 In Denmark, no unclassified literature has concluded that gaps 
in the national intelligence exist; instead, the relevant literature focuses on the changes the 
national intelligence services have gone through since the end of the Cold War. The 
director of the Danish Defense Intelligence Service (DDIS) Lars Findsen, in the foreword 
to an anthology written by esteemed Danish scholars, wrote:  
Changes in alliances and co-operation patterns between states will also 
affect the threats to Denmark in the coming decades. The same applies to 
threats from non-state actors in the form of terrorism and cyber-attacks. A 
solid intelligence will be an integral part of any attempt to control the risks 
facing Denmark. Many of the issues faced by the DDIS are very complex, 
and in several areas, our knowledge is so unique and detailed that the 
recipients of our products will ask for advice on what the most effective 
policy concerning threats and security challenges will be.122 
 Joseph Nye further underlines this statement in his 2011 book The Future of 
Power, where he argues that: “contextual intelligence, the ability to understand an evolving 
                                                 
118 Onderzoekgroep Inlichtingen en Veiligheid Defensie, Inlichtingen en Veiligheid Defensie: 
Kwaliteit, Capaciteit en Samenwerking, 39-40. 
119 De Graaf, Muller, and Van Reijn. Inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten, 624. 
120 Dutch Ministry of Defence. MIVD Jaarverslag 2017, 5. 
121 WRR, Veiligheid in een wereld van verbindingen, een strategische visie op het defensiebeleid, 12; 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, and Safety and 
Justice, Leidraad Geïntegreerde Benadering: De Nederlandse Visie op een Samenhangende Inzet op 
Veiligheid en Stabiliteit in Fragiele Staten en ConflictgebiedeLeidraad, 14.  
122 Kristian Soeby Kristensen and Jens Ringmose. Efterretningstjenesten fra 1967 – 2017: Fra Tidlig 
Varsling til Udenrigs Efterretningstjeneste. (Forsvarets Efterretningstjeneste, 2017), 7-8. [Danish Defence 
Intelligence Service 1967 – 2017: From Military Early Warning Service to Foreign Intelligence Service.] 
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environment and capitalize on trends, will become a crucial skill in enabling [political] 
leaders to convert power resources into successful strategies.”123 
The fourth area relates to the strategic role of SOF and their ability to support 
national policies. Even though the use of SOF has grown considerably during the last 
decades,124 very little scholarly literature relates to the use and development of SOF as a 
small-state instrument in present complex security environments.125  The existing literature 
is primarily focused on SOF from states with substantial military power, which to some 
extent may be of limited value for small European states. However, in the absence of 
literature that is primarily focused on small-state SOF, the next four paragraphs will review 
theories of scholars from large states.  
Christopher Lamb, a well-known American scholar, has contributed significantly 
to the literature on SOF roles. Lamb suggests three factors to assess the roles of SOF. These 
factors are the nature of the threats, the anticipated future security environment, and 
national security strategy to deal with these threats.126 Furthermore, he argues that, in order 
to grasp the real strategic value of SOF, leaders should assess the security challenges to the 
nation.127 In other words, SOF’s strategic utility is associated with the national security 
policies and strategies for countering threats.  
Colin Gray, a British strategic thinker and writer about strategy and how it relates 
to SOF, emphasizes SOF’s strategic utility. Gray argues that SOF can maximize the chance 
of conflict-prevention and support progress regarding security and stability in regions of 
national interest. He further attempts to identify the factors leading to successful 
                                                 
123 Nye, The Future of Power, xvii, 24. 
124 James D. Kiras, “A theory of Special Operations: These Ideas are Dangerous,” Special Operations 
Journal 1, no. 2 (November, 2015): 75-88.  
125 G. Eriksson and Ulrica Pettersson, Special Operations from a Small State Perspective: Future 
Security Challenges, (Basingstoke, UK: Springer Nature, 2017), 1. 
126 Christopher J. Lamb, “Perspectives on Emerging SOF Roles and Missions,” Special Warfare 8 
(July1995): 2. 
127 David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb, United States Special Operations Forces (New 
York:Columbia University Press, 2007). 
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employment of SOF. According to Gray the strategic use of SOF also relies upon the 
understanding of their potential by decision makers.128 
Additionally, former USSOCOM Commander General Votel asserted that SOF’s 
greatest value lies in generating more decision space and strategic options for policy-
makers.129 Whereas, Philip Lohaus discussed in his article: Special Operations Forces in 
the Gray Zone, that SOF are best employed in pre-conflict activities,130 Broyles and 
Blankenship stated  that SOF should be used as a component of a more holistic approach 
and that their missions should focus more on the pre-conflict activities (see Figure 7).131 
All these statements support the value of SOF as information collectors in low intensity 
(pre-) conflict situations increasing the decision space needed for national leaders to 
develop sound policies and strategies.  
Figure 7. SOF’s Shift of Focus to the Left Side of the Peace-War Continuum. 
As theories coincide with SOF’s strategic utility as information collectors, SOF, in 
this role, have also been mentioned in (Dutch) policy documents alongside the need of 
128 Gray, “The Strategic Utility of Special Operations,”163-188. 
129 USSOCOM, Directorate of Force Management and Development Concept Development and 
Integration Office. Special Operations Forces Operating Concept: A Whitepaper to Guide Special 
Operations Force Development. 
130 Lohaus, Phillip, “Special Operations Forces in the Gray Zone: An Operational Framework for 
Employing Special Operations Forces in the Space between War and Peace,” Special Operations Journal 2. 
no. 2, (December, 2016), http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Gray-Zone.pdf. 
131 David A. Broyles and Brody Blankenship, The Role of Special Operations Forces in Global 
Competition, DRM-2017-U-015225-1Rev (Arlington, VA: CNA, 2017), 28, 30, 
https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/DRM-2017-U-015225-1Rev.pdf. 
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reinforcing the capacity to generate strategic anticipation.132 In 2017, the Dutch Minister 
of Defense expressed SOF’s relevance in generating an adequate national information 
position together with other strategic actors in the pre-conflict phase to prevent escalation 
of conflicts.133 Furthermore, in their report Safety in a World of Connections, researchers 
from the Dutch scientific council for government policy have stated that, alongside a clear 
national prevention policy, additional strategic means are necessary for the following tasks: 
gather information, shape contextual understanding, and adequately enable national 
leadership to forecast and respond effectively to security issues.134  
The reviewed literature indicates an increasing need for intelligence for the 
development of national security policies within small European states. Moreover, the 
literature suggests that SOF have capabilities with which they can contribute to small-state 
information collection for national decision making to advance state interests. However, 
very little literature exists on how SOF from small states can do more to contribute to 
national policies. Consequently, this capstone focuses on a role for small-state SOF to 











                                                 
132 Dutch Ministry of Defense. Houvast in een Onzekere Wereld, 21; WRR, Veiligheid in een Wereld 
van Verbindingen, 11. 
133 Dutch Ministry of Defence. Houvast in een Onzekere Wereld, 21. 
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APPENDIX B.  INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
1. What are the threats Europe is facing/countering? 
2. What policy changes/trends in the different European countries have been 
seen in regards to countering the threats? 
3. How do these threats and trends impact small versus large European states 
differently? 
4. How are European states becoming more focused on their national 
interests? 
5. European states’ policies seem to be aimed at preventing conflicts from 
happening; what are the actions of European states regarding this 
preventive desire? 
6. How is the current complex security environment challenging the national 
decision-making in regards to building effective security strategies? 
7. What capabilities provide intelligence to develop the integated and 
preventive approaches (who provide the contextual understanding to 
ensure development of effective strategies)? 
8. What are the gaps in the current Intel capabilities/capacities? 
9. What are the current/future roles and core tasks for SOF in small European 
states and what are the capabilities and capacities to meet the 
requirements? 
10. Assuming there is a gap in Intel capabilities; what strategies/options are 
being considered to help SOF fill that gap. 
11. Based on the increase of threats in the world and the intent of states to act 
preventively, what is the intelligence community’s (IC) current 
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capability to provide intelligence for the development of (bi-)national 
integrated approaches? 
12. Besides using SOF as an extra instrument for information collection for 
national decision making, what other options can be considered to expand 
this strategic capacity? 
13. While weighing different options or validating the SOF option, which 
criteria or aspect have been considered? 
14. What are the focus areas or areas of tension in regards to using SOF as an 
information collector for national decision making? 
15. In what way do SOF manage a guaranteed sustainability of the concept for 
information collection for national decision making, besides their doctrinal 
tasks—MA, DA, and SR, in the future? 
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